


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# ***JPRS Report***



## **Soviet Union**

### ***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 6, November-December 1989

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# Soviet Union

## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 6, November-December 1989

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26 March 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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### SOCIOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORM

#### Economic Priorities in the Social Sphere

905D0008A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
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[Article by Aleksandr Vitalyevich Telyukov, candidate of economic sciences and sector head at the Scientific Research Economics Institute Under the USSR Gosplan. Our journal has published his article "How to Introduce New Types of Services" (co-author, No 4, 1984) as well as a number of reviews]

[Text] The social sphere, as an object of economic policy, can be viewed as a unity of three component parts: distribution relations—services for the public—the regulation of employment. Let us endeavor to note such principles of perestroika in each element which would assist in the closer coordination of them between themselves.

As is known, during the years of the 12th Five-Year Plan, there has been a definite reorientation to solving social problems with the proportional amount of the consumption fund rising in the use of national income, with the increase rate of expenditures on nonproduction construction surpassing by several-fold the dynamics of production capital investments and an increase in the share of services in gross national product. At the same time, the real income of the population (the aggregate indicator of prosperity) has risen at a slower pace and under the conditions of an evermore marked commodity-monetary imbalance, the end effect of many social measures has declined substantially.

The experience of recent years indicates that in order for the social changes to become more profound and assume an irreversible nature, it is essential, in the first place, to strengthen the stimulating functions of distribution policy in order to achieve an actual conversion of socially useful labor into a source of well-being; secondly, to exclude the return to the residual method in allocating resources for social development, and protect the social sphere from unpredicted shifts in economic policy and the structure of budget priorities. Here an important role must be played by the mechanism for automatic expanded reproduction, specific accumulation and the utilization of social development resources. Thirdly, it is essential to reconnect the nonproduction sectors with the

commodity-monetary economy. The sociocultural institutions should operate with maximum benefit for society and at the same time have their own material interest. Otherwise, that is, in maintaining a complete economic lack of motivation for the "producers" of unpaid goods, the major additional resources for the development of the nonproduction sphere will not produce the expected return.

The designated goals can scarcely be reached without a revision in the most important guidelines in distribution policy, a comprehensive reform in the public consumption funds and the elaboration of a new system for financing the sociocultural institutions. Let us examine each of the mentioned questions in greater detail.

#### Career—Earnings—Pension

The distribution of income as a whole and, in particular, the wages of manual and white collar workers is about 3.2 points according to a decile coefficient. At the same time, the processes of the intercountry leveling out of the income differentiation levels for hired labor show that in a developed economy, the wage system ceases to impede a rise in labor productivity or prevent a territorial, sectorial and vocational-skill mobility in the labor force with a 6-fold gap between the opposing 10-percent groups of employees.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, at precisely that time material remuneration begins to perform socioeconomic functions such as bringing the wage conditions according to professions, specialties and occupations into accord with the actual differences of the specific types of labor in complexity, intensity and social importance; encouraging vocational growth of the worker and an his active planning of his career in all stages of labor activity; assisting free economic choice in favor of various types of employment as well as spheres, sectors and form of job placement; providing a socially "painless" flow of the labor force between the social economy and the sphere of individual (family) and cooperative labor.

With a 6-fold differentiation of the public in terms of the wage level, grounds appear for sharply restricting the sphere of the state impact on wages over the next 10 years. Centralized measures will regulate the national economic labor income minimum and compensate for the surplus differentiation with the aid of a progressive tax on high end income. As for the rest, earnings will be regulated on the basis of the self-planning of the cost accounting (leased) enterprises and the market conditions for setting income in the individual-cooperative sector. This, on the one hand, will provide the labor collectives with an economic incentive to participate in perestroika, and which has been so insufficient in relation to the current attempts to impose quasi-cost accounting relations from above; on the other, this will guarantee the comparability of material interests in the different national economic sectors and consequently their balanced development and drawing together for the indicators of profitability and the product price level.

Ultimately it will be possible to abandon the rigid extraeconomic regulation and move to a "management by relations" from the socially acceptable guidelines of a low-level and differentiation of income. Thus, economic independence in a key production element will be restored in one of its main manifestations.

The public consumption funds (PCF) are required in the reform. In our view, it is essential to set up specific state social insurance funds. The deductions by the enterprises and organizations for social insurance should not flow in a single channel into the "common pot" of the state budget but rather be accumulated for specific social programs. First of all, it makes sense to establish a system for obligatory medical insurance, a state fund for the young family, education and retraining of personnel as well as a state employment insurance fund.

Along with the state funds, it would be advisable to develop collective voluntary insurance funds for the main types of monetary payments and social benefits and primarily, pension and medical self-insurance for the workers. It would be also possible to switch to the forming of these funds a portion of the money of the enterprises deducted according to compulsory specific rates for social security or above these rates in the process of the "socially responsible" distribution of the cost accounting income as well as by giving bonuses to the employees in insurance policies or routine payments. Due to self-insurance, there will be the real use of additional money in the wage fund and at the same time it will be possible to avoid a direct contribution of monetary payments to the strengthening of the commodity-monetary imbalance. The multiplicity of insurance funds will make it possible to more narrowly specialize each of them in terms of goals as well as in terms of the sociodemographic and vocational groups of the public. One other advantage is that the struggle which inevitably arises between the fund for a service contingent leads to economic competition according to the principle "maximum services with a competitive insurance payment rate." As a result, there is a rise in the discipline of expending the money and the financial effectiveness of the entire social security system.

It would be advisable to decentralize the financial PCF system. The results of many social programs will be more tangible if these are turned over for administration to the local soviets. Expenditures under these programs to a significant degree should be covered from the local taxes on the profits of the self-financing enterprises and organizations as well as by monies distributed from the national specific social insurance funds.

Without eliminating distribution according to labor, it is essential to strengthen the linkage of the social payments and benefits with the results of the socially useful activity of man. At present, the PCF not only do not carry out an incentive function but in certain instances impede a rise in labor productivity in the national economy. Thus, the size of the pension does not depend upon the amount of wages over a larger portion of the labor career. At an age

of the highest labor activity a person is not interested in paying to insure himself a maximum pension but, on the other hand, during the last year the load must be increased regardless of whether strength permits this. In other words, the ability and the interest in working productively differ in time.

The link of the amount of pension with uninterrupted employment and years worked evermore obviously contradicts the demand of the economy for the mass liberation and redistribution of employees, as it fetters a person to his job and intensifies the fear of interrupting labor activity for a certain period.

In order to overcome the designated shortcomings, it is essential, in our view, to abandon the granting of a pension considering the overall and continuous length of employment and introduce a complete period for pension insurance. This can be calculated, for instance, by 10-15 years of permanent (over a quarter) employment in the social economy and give the right to the receipt of a pension upon reaching pension age. In this instance, there will be a significant broadening of the freedom for the self-determination of the employee in relation to both the sphere of employment as well as the form of job placement. Depending upon family and other circumstances, a woman can interrupt her professional activities without fearing for the future of her pension. Furthermore, it would be advisable to set a direct link between the amount of the newly granted old-age pension and the average annual earnings over a period commensurable in terms of the number of years with a total labor life. If the figures include the earnings of the last 30-35 years, a person, without endeavoring to achieve continuous employment, will also work "beyond" the insurance period (maintaining the limit of the pension age will also provide a stimulus in the same direction). Here there will be a more responsible attitude toward labor income in youth and in the elderly years and at the same time the dependence upon the pre-pension earnings will be reasonably reduced.

Finally, the right to early retirement should become generally available. For a majority this will involve a certain reduction in the pension (proportional to the number of unworked months) in comparison with its full amount. The introduction of such a practice, on the one hand, democratizes the most important social payment (it reduces the average statistical limit of the overall pension age) and on the others, makes it possible to more fully consider the requirement of the national economy for the accelerated renewal of the labor force.

It is very important to strengthen the orientation of monetary payments from the PCF to supporting family income. The amount of pensions paid for old age, disability or in the event of the loss of the head of the household must be set considering the family situation of the recipient and differentiated depending upon whether or not he has underage children or disabled children, whether there are parents to support and so forth. The

proposed approach, in turn, is tantamount to introducing family assistance derived from the main social payment. A system of such assistance will make it possible to bring the income of many families which do not have a sufficient source of earnings to a socially acceptable level; to assist the less well-off families in performing their socially important functions (supporting underage children or elderly parents; creating material conditions for the children to obtain an education); to more flexibly distribute labor remuneration between spouses (a woman who in old age is guaranteed assistance totaling 50 percent of the full pension of the husband can plan her own employment relatively freely).

Finally, it is essential to systematically revise the amount of social payments considering the changing conditions under which the monetary income of the public is realized. Here the main thing is to consider the increase in prices. The "basket" of goods and services used for calculating the composite consumer price index should be set separately for the regions, the urban settlements and rural localities. The price level for each position should be fixed as the "average purchase prices," that is, proceeding from the redistribution of the market stocks of product and services between the public, cooperative and individual sectors of the consumer market.

#### Financial Conditions for the Service Sphere

The successful restructuring of the social sphere will depend largely upon the national economic guidelines which determine the development of the nonproductive sectors and strengthen the commodity-monetary principle in the service economy. First of all, it is essential to completely overcome the archaic stereotype of thinking which for a long time has underestimated the role of the social and domestic infrastructure. At the same time, we must not go to the other extreme of following the "progressive" dogma according to which the more rapid development of the nonproduction sphere is an indisputable benefit for the national economy.

How can we achieve balanced development in the two spheres of the economy? The main thing certainly is the unification of the material composition of prices for goods and services in such a manner that both reflect all the factors which form the value of a product of expanded reproduction. The rates for paid services and the prices for "producing" gratis services realized in the system of relations of internal budget cost accounting (we will take this up below) must be constructed according to the formula "cost + profit." The amount of the latter should provide the national economic level for the profitability of the nonproduction sectors. Such a prerequisite is essential in order to maintain a financial-cost balance in the economy under the conditions of the free and active transfer of resources between the two spheres. With an equal repayment on investments, the process of the more rapid development of the nonproduction sectors assumes an inner economic sense and becomes possible as a phenomenon of a self-regulating

economy and not as a result of the administrative imposition of national economic priorities.

At present, the profitability level for the individual types of services differs substantially: in the areas of paid services extensive zones of planned losses survive. A transition to the more rapid cost accounting development of the nonproduction sphere will bring about a sharp restructuring in the sectorial proportions and this does not in all ways coincide with the demand structure. Probably there will be an abrupt increase in prices caused by the desire of the producers to escape from the burden of economic losses.

Considering what has been said, the initial measure to accelerate the development of the service sphere (and not to the detriment of the financial and cost balance in the national economy) should be not so much the allocating of large additional resources as the planned retariffing of services for bringing the sectorial profitability indicators of the services into accord with the average level for the economy. At the same time, it is essential to reduce the centralized portion of the net income from the enterprises in the material sphere by the amount of the eliminated subsidies allocated for the previous paid services operating at a loss. The savings of the enterprises in the deductions to the state budget will provide material compensation for the workers in line with the increased cost of certain types of services.

The "resetting" of the financial proportions for conditions of expanded reproduction will achieve its goals only under the condition of the simultaneous putting into operation of an effective antiexpenditure mechanism within the limits of direct or internal budget cost accounting (with the "culling" of lost enterprises and organizations).

The next principle is to bring the two spheres of the national economy closer in terms of the level of return from the utilized resources. While the first condition (the equal return on investments) is an essential prerequisite for the accelerated and balanced development of the service sectors, the second can be viewed as sufficient.

Whatever profitability is initially established in the service sphere, price competition will not make it possible to maintain it on an acceptable (in comparison with the material sphere level) if labor productivity, the return on investment and other values inverse to the service "capacities" will lose out significantly to the commodity-producing sectors. This is precisely what is happening in the nation as labor productivity and the return on investment in the sociocultural complex is 3.1- and 2.2-fold lower than in the material sectors. The gap between the two spheres of the economy in terms of the level of the economically effective use of resources is much more noticeable than in the other developed countries (in the United States, for example, for the designated indicators it is 1.3- and 1.5-fold, respectively [2]). Among the reasons for this are the insufficient skills of the workers employed in the service sphere, the

unjustifiably low pay for a majority of the nonproduction specialties and the substantial lag behind the material sectors in terms of the amounts and quality of the fixed capital and its active part.

Consequently, in order to incorporate the more rapid development of the service sphere into the process of optimizing the entire national economic complex, in parallel with the expansion of the scale it is essential to intensify significantly the services. In investment policy, more attention must be given to reconstruction and technical reequipping and as for new construction it should be closely correlated to eliminating hopelessly obsolete facilities. It is time to abandon the facile notions of the possibilities of redistribution of labor resources into the nonproduction sphere. The attraction of additional employee contingents must be correlated with the efforts to create technically well-equipped work areas. The enthusiasm for employing millions of "barefoot" medics and teachers has led to an acute contradiction with the technological standards of services in a modern, fully computerized (in the West) sociocultural sphere, not to mention those nonproduction spheres where the technical and economic level is similar to industrial production. Material incentives for the employees for high end results assumes particular importance in the question of intensifying services.

The designated conditions for the financial and cost balancing of the two spheres can be normally reproduced only in observing in the service sectors the common principles of a commodity-monetary system with a diversity of ownership forms and approaches to the organization of services. In the utility-domestic (traditionally paid) services, it is important to overcome the technical and economic stereotypes, that is, abandon the excessive concentration of capacity, maximally differentiate the types and sizes, the criteria for territorial adjustment and the principles for the operation of the enterprises and institutions. The unilateral approach when expanding the network is carried out predominantly by large enterprises oriented at impersonal "average statistical" requirements and tastes should be replaced by the principle of the balanced development of large, medium and small organizational forms. Along with the standard types of services provided according to a unified production scheme, evermore attention must be given to individualized services which reflect the minute nuances of demand.

Clearly, the turning of services into an element of daily consumption presupposes the saturating of the territory with small service facilities—both state as well as family-cooperative and individual. Here an important condition for their successful operation is a flexible price formation mechanism and high material interest of the employees. In order to synthesize the various forms of ownership into a single economic mechanism in the service sphere and ensure the coexistence of small and large enterprises, it is essential to overcome the rigid directive planning, having put unlimited distribution of contractual and leasehold relations in opposition to it.

### How Much Is a Ruble in Services "Worth"?

The sociocultural facilities need, in our view, a special economic mechanism within which medical assistance, the process of education and many types of cultural services, in remaining basically unpaid, would be turned into viable forms of economic activity with the "producers" of the corresponding services having a direct material interest in high end results.

For this it is essential to abandon the existing practice of estimate financing for the gratis services facilities and convert to covering their expenditures using specific rates, that is, calculated per patient who has undergone a course of treatment, a certified young specialist, a retrained employee and so forth. A system of such standards following a typology according to the end tasks of the services will become an economic guarantee for allocating resources in an amount not below the necessary for achieving the set quality standards. In putting the result of sociocultural services (as the criterion for covering the production expenditures) as the focus, the new norming system will also encourage their rational saving. Money unjustifiably overspent relative to the standard level would not be recovered while that saved without hurting quality would remain in the budget of the institution.

In essence, the norms would set the price of the service and make it possible for the facilities not only to cover their outlays but also earn a profit. In the sociocultural facilities there would thus arise a sort of internal budget cost accounting.

Due to such a mechanism, the sectors of unpaid services can achieve self-financing on the basis of a market interaction with the purchaser. Society as a whole will act as the latter. The realization of social interests in acquiring educational, medical and other socially significant services will rest on a system of normed compensation drawing on money in the specific funds of compulsory and voluntary social insurance. Supplementary financing sources could be subsidies from the Union and territorial budgets, money from the enterprises which conclude direct contracts with the sociocultural facilities and, finally, payment by the public. The key element in the internal budget cost accounting should be a system of democratic control over the activities of the sociocultural sphere as well as a mechanism of applying, economic, legal and public sanctions for poor quality services.

As was already pointed out above, for the balanced interaction of the two spheres of the economy, it is important to correctly assess the possibilities for the more rapid growth of the nonproduction sphere. First of all, it is essential to have a clear understanding of at just what economic stage we are in the development of consumer facilities. The extended existence of the sociocultural infrastructure under the conditions of acute resource insufficiency, isolation from the commodity-monetary economy and standing outside the process of

expanded reproduction, led to a situation where the value and prices of services were significantly understated both in relation to commodities as well as from the viewpoint of the socially and even the technologically acceptable minimum of expenditures on developing vitally important types of services.

It is worthy of note that American economists, without showing the real scale of resource hunger in the service sphere of the USSR and endeavoring here to at least somehow explain its survival with such low indicators of public outlays, were "forced" to ascribe a mystically high purchasing power to the ruble which is spent on providing resources to the service sphere. At the same time, in terms of the commodity portion of the gross domestic product of the USSR, the parity of the purchasing power of the dollar and the ruble was characterized by American specialists with ratios of from 2.1:1 to 2.5:1, for the range of nonproduction services this was 5:1 and in public health even 10:1 [3]. In actuality, a bed-place in a Soviet medical inpatient facility of 12 rubles of daily routine expenditures carries out (unfortunately, only nominally) the same therapeutic and diagnostic tasks as an American bed with a daily cost of \$460 [4, p 394; 5, p 100].

If one adopts a uniform price construction for expanded reproduction of goods and services as well as a price ratio for goods and services existing in the United States beginning in the mid-1940s (and rather objectively reflecting the correspondence of prices to uniform quality criteria for the entire market), then it turns out in our nation for bringing prices for services into real accord with the national economic level of socially necessary expenditures, it would be necessary to increase the indicator for the aggregate product of the nonproduction sphere by almost double or by approximately 110 billion rubles [6].

The economic sense of such an evaluation is seen in the following: around 110 billion rubles must be additionally invested into the nonproduction sectors within their current boundaries (with an unchanged service network) in order for them to fulfill their socioeconomic functions not in words but in deeds and not being inferior to the commodity-producing sectors in terms of the opportunities for resource support.

In following the American structure of average sectorial prices for services (and this has been tested out by years of experience of sales under market conditions and has remained essentially unchanged over the last 3 decades), some  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the 110 billion ruble increase would have to go to increase the wages of employees [6]. As a result, the wage intensiveness of services which at present is greater than in material production would even more noticeably exceed the indicator for the commodity-producing sphere.

What has been said means that the more rapid development of the nonproduction sectors (with the balanced combination of different types of resources) would begin

to generate additional solvent demand on the part of the workers employed in these sectors and this only partially could be satisfied by the expanding volume of realized services. To a significant degree this would flow into the commodity market where there is already an excess of demand over supply.

In the United States, the process of the noticeably more rapid development of the nonproduction sphere as a whole fits within the chronological limits of 1955-1970. By 1960, here on a per capita basis, 1.5-fold more meat was consumed than at present in the USSR, 10 percent more vegetable oil, 20 percent more vegetables, 2-fold more fruits [4, p 425; 5, p 114]. The supply of motor vehicles for the public has surpassed the present level of the USSR by 7-fold and the value of accumulated household property (not including homes) by 6-fold. The structure of personal consumption expenditures looked, according to our current views, more than modern: the share of foodstuffs was 25.5 percent (in the USSR it is now over 40 percent) while paid services were 42.5 percent (in the USSR, less than 15 percent) [4, p 419, 447; 7].

Thus, the United States has "set out" on the more rapid development of the nonproduction sphere, relying on the solid foundation of the solvent demand of the public for commodities which is satisfied in terms of volume and structure.

In our nation such a basis is absent as the additional demand for material products, in accompanying, as was pointed out, the accelerated development of services, can intensify the scarcity of "primary" consumer goods. The population groups with average and high incomes will feel most the broadening of the services. However, the social effect will be neutralized by the additional burdens for the less well-off consumers under the conditions of the shortage of food products. The more rapid growth of the service sphere activates the process of stratification in society depending upon the opportunities for spending monetary income and the level of prosperity. It is not to be excluded that the high-earning producers of expensive services (in particular, in the individual cooperative sector) will isolate themselves from the market and limit themselves to servicing others like themselves.

#### **Socioeconomic Conditions for Rational Employment**

In the area of managing employment, the main task is to overcome the noneconomic methods for attracting the labor force and begin establishing a labor market in the nation. The latter must provide materially justified and socially just forms for reconciling personal and public interests in the employment sphere. In practice, this would guarantee the real legal and economic independence in preferring the specific spheres, sectors and forms of labor placement.

The initial level in forming a labor market is abandoning in national economic planning the dogmatic view of full employment. If this comes about, there will finally be a

demand by society to free the labor force. The enterprises will be able to use the economic results from the mechanization and automation of production. With the presence of a large-scale system for retraining, reallocation and job placement for those released, territorial, sectorial and vocational mobility will rise substantially and better prerequisites will occur for working an incomplete workday as well as flexible schedules. Other forms of reconciling the interests of production and the persons employed in it will begin to be established. Ultimately, the labor factor will cease to restrain the technical reequipping and structural reshaping of the economy (as now happens) and this, in turn, will help overcome the strictly extensive type of reproduction for production capacity. On the social level, there will be broader opportunities for combining professional labor with other forms of socially useful activity.

The first steps aimed at organizing a labor market were undertaken by establishing a mechanism for releasing and reallocating the labor force, however the absence of a favorable sociopolitical climate did not make it possible to achieve the desired results. Among the economic reasons for the failure the main one is that the enterprises do not have any economic independence which would cause an interest in releasing employees.

Thus, increased mobility of the labor force is possible only through the channel of a comprehensive restructuring of the economic mechanism. What measures are needed here to be taken in the area of centralized management of employment? In our view, the primary thing here is establishing a system for mass retraining, territorial redistribution and labor force job placement bodies.

Furthermore, it is essential to provide for the interaction of the state, the economic sectors and territorial self-administration, in specializing the central bodies in the interregional reallocation of employees, the sectorial agencies (and in the future, the voluntary associations of cost accounting enterprises) on the internal sectorial movement of personnel and the local soviets on solving the employment problem within the territory. Coordinating the three elements is possible by the balanced allocation between them of the flow of financial assets from the state employment insurance fund.

One of the important questions which must be settled is related to material compensation. In our view, it is essential to extend the break in employment up to 5-6 months and eliminate the current procedure whereby monetary compensation is planned as a single payment without a narrowly specific purpose. For this reason, it makes sense to substantially reduce the main assistance, introducing a right to the free use of certain services as well as chiefly the specific additional payments (scholarships at a retraining center, traveling allowances differentiated upon the area of the forthcoming place of residence, and so forth).

As for the adaptation of the state programs for managing the labor market in terms of the specific features of small enterprises and the particular economic interests of the individual-cooperative sector, in posing the given task we have proceeded from the prospects of establishing diverse forms of ownership in which manpower mobility would rise and the redistribution would assume a more unpredictable character than is currently the case.

An important social effect of the proposed measures to regulate employment will consist in establishing the right to labor precisely as an economic right and not as a guarantee of social support which it currently is.

### The Guideline—The Quality of Life

The designated approaches concern the most acute social problems requiring immediate solution. At the same time, we must not overlook the long-term goals of raising the prosperity of the people. An orientation to the future can be perceived as an "exotic" of the distant future and it can even contradict current tasks, but it is essential for working out a successive and enterprising social policy. Let us briefly take up certain long-term guidelines in the restructuring of social administration.

All the social indicators planned in our nation come down to the quantitative level of consumption. The growth of the latter is essential but, as is now becoming evermore apparent, this is not sufficient for increasing prosperity. Moreover, this often contradicts the fundamental guidelines of social progress. Thus, increased wages in the national economy to a large degree are achieved by increasing the compensatory surpayments and bonuses, including in line with bad working conditions. There still are 50 million jobs with manual, physically hard labor giving the right to an additional payment (at times, a significant one) on top of wages. Here 75 percent of the funds for improving working conditions is made up of monetary compensation by which the hirers of the labor force buy off those who agree to sacrifice their health for the sake of money.

There are also other manifestations of the designated trend. The production of complicated but unreliable household equipment with unchanged legislation is tantamount to strengthening the legal impotence of the consumer when confronted by shoddy products. Along with "unpaid" public health, the illegal monetary "remuneration" which medics receive from patients is becoming evermore widespread. Rapid housing construction has been accompanied by a deterioration in the psychological climate and the ecology of residing in rapidly developing settlements.

Behind each of the given examples is a situation where the supply of vital goods is accompanied by a deterioration in social conditions. The reduction in the end effect is explained by the fact that the rise in the consumer standard has often impeded the forming of socially progressive views of life.

Into the theory and practice of social administration, it is essential to incorporate the notion of the "quality of life" as a measure of an uncontradictory combination, on the one hand, of increased consumption and, on the other, a change in the value orientations of society. Increased prosperity presupposes the coordinated growth of the level of consumption and the quality of life. In other words, movement toward an abundance of goods and services should not cause a deterioration in the structure of the population's time budget or negatively impact the security and stability of the environment or the sociopsychological climate.

In keeping with the increased level of general education and vocational culture, with the stronger orientation of people to skilled labor and as access to vocational, training, scientific and leisure information is broadened, consumer preferences in the public changed in favor of meaningful, highly organized forms of consumer, domestic and recreational activity. The corresponding goods and services (be this a motor vehicle, a personal computer or freedom of travel unlimited on the material level) possess a particularly high consumer effect. However, in order to realize this on the scale of society, it is not enough to saturate the market with these goods and services. It is essential to create a political, sociopsychological and legal environment favorable to their consumption. The providing of such "institutional" prerequisites for the development of a progressive consumer model goes far beyond the limits of economic relations but precisely the given process opens up the path to changes in the consumption sphere and a socially mature society should be oriented at this.

Important tasks remain to be carried out in the area of socioeconomic changes. The management of social processes should be based upon a system of multidimensional evaluation of the social results of economic development. One of the prime tasks is to coordinate the three fundamentally different groups of characteristics: economic (traditionally adopted in planning) indicators of the standard of living, expert indicators of the quality of life and subjective judgments of the public concerning their own social well-being. Such a system of assessments would combine quantitative measurements with judgments by the experts and economic information with the data from sociological research. It would be possible to combine all the obtained characteristics in a single integral indicator, a national index of the living conditions.

Of particular interest, in my view, are the subjective evaluations which show to what degree reality corresponds to the aspirations and expectations of the individual, the social stratum and society. Has not our social policy been wrong because in working it out we have forgotten to establish the needs, desires and requirements of the people? In other words, a correct choice of the social priorities presupposes steady feedback from all stories of the social edifice and it [the feedback], in turn, requires a constant improvement in the subjective assessments of well-being and the development of a sort

of "sociology of happiness." A major contribution must be made to this question by experts who are capable of thoroughly assessing the economic and political situation in the nation as well as formulate a representative sampling of the public for sociological research on the quality indicators of well-being. The proposed area could become one of the priority programs in sociological work and would noticeably improve the quality of social administration.

#### Footnote

1. Estimated from 13 developed capitalist nations [1].

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#### Prices With a Price Ceiling and Floor

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pp 13-20

[Article by Farkhid Nazipovich Ilyasov, candidate of philosophical sciences and science associate at the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published his articles: "Experimental Basis for the Number of Scale Divisions" (No 4, 1984), "Public Opinion on Unearned Income" (No 5, 1988, as co-author) and a number of reviews]

[Text] The absence up to the present of a satisfactory price theory in world science is explained, in my view, by the fact that the latter traditionally is considered a strictly economic category and its sociological aspects have fallen out of the perusal of the researchers. As a result, an integrated notion has not been formulated of a price as a socioeconomic phenomenon and this impedes the effective use of the price formation mechanism. Let me attempt to designate certain sociological approaches to an analysis of this phenomenon.

### Who Dictates Prices?

Let me begin with a slight explanation. If a telephone sold in a store has a retail price of 50 rubles, then its wholesale price (that is, the true production costs plus enterprise profit) is around 25 rubles. The difference between the retail and wholesale price (in the given instance 25 rubles) is in its economic essence one of the forms of indirect taxation called an excise tax. After the tax reform carried out in our nation in 1930-1931, the designated difference was named the "turnover tax." At the same time, it was stated that an excise tax had been eliminated in the USSR and existed only under capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

The turnover tax is set on articles having increased demand or prestige consumption. Theoretically, being a portion of the net income of a socialist society, it goes completely to the state budget. But in practice a significant portion of it goes to subsidize unprofitable and loss-producing goods.

Two secrets are tied up with the mentioned tax. The first, a state secret (at present, it obviously can be revealed) derives from those ideological considerations which so mysteriously and illogically forced the renaming of the excise tax. In essence, this is a tax paid by the purchaser and the addition "turnover" assumes that it is a matter of the turnover or working assets of the producer. In actuality, the producer receives only a wholesale price for his product and, strictly speaking, the turnover tax has no relation to the retail price. The situation is not altered by the fact that the enterprise itself pays to the budget a similar tax on certain types of goods.

The notorious name was to conceal (clearly, someone found this "inconvenient" or even "incompatible") the fact of the existence of such indirect taxes under socialism as the excise tax (collected through the prices of goods in broad consumption) and the fiscal monopolies (a particular form of excise taxation whereby the state declares a state monopoly on the production and trade of individual goods, setting increased prices and collecting enormous taxes from the consumer).

The other secret, the economic one, consists in the fact that no one knows the method for calculating the turnover tax. Nevertheless, it not only exists, but in individual instances reaches impressive amounts.

How is its amount set? Behind each line in calculating costs, there are specific methods of measuring expenditures and these make it possible to obtain exhaustive information on why the wholesale price, for instance, of a bottle of Pshenichnaya [Wheat] Vodka (a half-liter) is 21.5 kopecks and the wholesale price of a GAZ-24 Volga car is 2,880 rubles. But as for the question as to why the retail price of the bottle (with a screw cap) is 10 rubles and the GAZ-24 ("without surcharges for better design and operating indicators") is 15,000 rubles, there is no concrete answer. How can one explain in the first instance that the turnover tax is 46-fold greater than the wholesale price and in the second over 5-fold more?

In what manner is the gap determined between the wholesale and retail price or, what is the same thing, how is the amount of the latter determined? Here three initial methodological principles are at work: 1) analogy (the existing price level for analogous goods); 2) intuition (of the "author" or more often the "authors" of the price); 3) the opinion "from above."

If one considers that the first principle (analogy) in its essence represents the two other ones (intuition and "opinion") only realized sooner, it becomes understandable that the retail price level and, respectively, the amount of the turnover tax are directly linked to subjective assessments. Thus, it is a matter of the economic conduct of the subjects [principals] of the market. From this it follows that a solution to the problem (or at least a certain portion of it) moves from the sphere of the concrete economy into the sphere of economic sociology [4].

With any subjective measurement, the subject [principal] cannot be absolutely certain of its accuracy. Doubts are also inherent to the officials who set prices. Let me give an example illustrating the action of the above-mentioned principles of retail price formation.

As is known, after entering a taxi on the meter there appears the amount of the "base fare" of 20 kopecks. When the vehicle sets off, for every 100 m of movement the figures change one after another with 22, 24, 26 and so forth. Contrary to economic logic, the taxi meter almost mystically shows only even amounts of kopecks. What is the issue here?

When over 10 years ago it was discovered that for a portion of the nation's taxi fleets the profitability was significantly below a level necessary for normal operation, out of the two possible variations for solving the problem—either improve the production activities of the lagging vehicle fleets or increase the fare for the use of the taxi—the second was chosen. Within this variation, two proposals were also made: increase the fare by 50 percent (that is, set 15 kopecks per 1 km) or by 100 percent (that is, 20 kopecks). There was no specific argument in favor of either decision. In truth, there was the very possibility of a rise in the sense of forecasting solvent demand. This was unambiguously shown during those years by the coefficient of demand elasticity for the services of taxis relative to the real income of the

population [5, p 78], and now, more importantly, by the formula of the regression dependence of the expenditures on taxi services upon the amount of population income [Ibid., p 79].

Why did the proposals arise to set precisely 15 or 20 kopecks and not, for instance, 16 or 21? It seems that there was one reason: round figures possess a particular psychological attractiveness, primarily, evidently, due to convenience of calculation. Incidentally, there was one objective argument in favor of a 100-percent increase in the fare. This was proposed by the maintenance service of the motor transport workers. Since the new fare was to be introduced on the same day over the territory of the entire nation, an enormous number of new meters had to be prepared. Without even mentioning the expenditures for production, it was impossible to do this in the necessary time. It was possible to reset the old meters quickly and reliably (on the far righthand wheel the teeth were engaged opposite the uneven numbers and for this reason the reading jumped from zero to 2 kopecks and then 4 and so forth) only under the condition of increasing the fare by 100 percent. So the "technological" argument helped the supporters of the adopted decision set a fare of 20 kopecks per kilometer. Let me add to conclude this subject: for the first several days the nation's public completely boycotted the taxis, however several months after the most popular "April fool's" joke of 1977, receipts approached the level of the old fares. The supporters of a doubling of the fare were "right." And the plant manufacturing the meters some 12 years later is still using such a fortuitously found simple method for resetting and the figures as before jump from 20 kopecks immediately to 22 and then by even numbers alone....

#### A Tax Table of Ranks

But let us return to the turnover tax. If those who set it do not know how it is calculated, then what does this tax represent from the viewpoint of price formation theory? There are three conceptual approaches to its interpretation. According to the first, the turnover tax is the reflection in price of the amount of the good's consumer value; according to the second, it is a reflection of the ratio of supply and demand. Within the third explanation (in my view, the most reliable), the designated tax represents simultaneously the reflection of consumer value and the ratio of supply and demand.

Thus, there is the completely natural conclusion that the subjects [principals] setting the amount of the turnover tax intuitively grasp to what degree consumer value for a specific good and the ratio of supply and demand for it make it possible to set an "optimum" (maximum?) retail price.

But since it is an issue of a subjective reflection of an objective economic situation, it is possible to speak of the subordination of the subjective reflection to real patterns. From this it follows that the problem of measuring the turnover tax consists in locating the patterns

underlying the subjective measurements. In other words, it is essential to establish how they measure: consumer value, the relation of supply and demand (the degree of the good's scarcity) and in what proportion monetary equivalents are assigned to the measured values.

The subjectivity in measuring the turnover tax leads to a situation where there are certain vacillations (dispersions) in its amount even with a suitable economic situation. However, a definite average dependence probably can be discovered. I will take up only one and that is the ratio of the wholesale price and the maximum value of the turnover tax or, what is the same in the given instance, the wholesale and maximum retail prices.

The ratio of supply and demand is regulated not only by the quantity of purchasers and the good but also by consumer value. A change in this with the same balance of supply and demand involves a change in price. A price will increase for a more fashionable or prestigious thing. At the same time, a change in consumer value is capable of influencing the amount of the balance of supply and demand as with increased "fashionability" of a good there is an increase in the number of those who want to purchase it. (A characteristic example was the noisy "velvet boom." The Beatles one fine day came out on the stage in velvet suits—at that time a very unfashionable good—and literally on the next morning velvet had become a good in increased demand in many corners of the world.)

On the other hand, the balance of supply and demand influences the amount of consumer value. For example, the scarcity of one or another good makes it prestigious and thereby increases consumer value. We might recall how with the lifting of the subscription limit to certain periodicals, the number of subscribers fell as there was no longer any action of the factor of scarcity on consumer value and as a result of this the latter dropped for many to a level below the purchase value (see also [3]).

From what has been stated, it follows that it is arbitrary to make a separate review of consumer value and the ratio of supply and demand. In actuality, they cannot exist in isolation, as these are not two separate factors but rather a dialectical whole. It is no accident that in calculating a price, either one or the other is represented by the same indivisible concept of the "turnover tax." The dialectical total of consumer value and the balance of supply and demand is reflected approximately and intuitively in it.

Thus, the problem arises of measuring precisely this amount, let's call it the consumer-exchange index. As was pointed out, the amount of consumer value and the ratio of supply and demand in their dialectical relationship are reflected in the price in the form of the turnover tax. Let us examine the ratio of the amount of the latter and the wholesale price in the price structure for consumer goods, that is, let us analyze the retail price structure from the viewpoint of the relationship of the wholesale, on the one hand, and the consumer value and

demand, on the other. The choice of consumer goods was caused by the fact that in comparison with production and technical end products, here the mentioned ratio is reflected more fully.

In the course of analysis, it was discovered that with an increase in the wholesale price, the absolute value of the turnover tax rose while the relative value (in comparison with the amount of the wholesale price) declined. Here a cursory acquaintance with sampling data make it possible to speak of a clearly definite trend. Let us examine what is the nature of the given relationship for the most important aspect and, namely, how does the maximum value of the turnover tax change with an increase in the wholesale price.

For this purpose, a grouping of prices has been constructed according to their amount and this grouping is based upon the following consideration: the adjacent intervals provide a qualitative distinction in the amount of the price. In essence, such a grouping should reflect the qualitative difference of the goods. In other words, if the quality of one good is double the quality of another, then the price of the former should be respectively double the latter. Proceeding from this, a grouping was constructed based on a geometric progression with a denominator equal to 2. The grouping is shown in Table 1, the second column (the upper values of the intervals are given).

**Table 1: Ratio of Amount of Wholesale Price and Maximum Value of Turnover Tax**

Interval Number	Amount of Wholesale Price, rubles	Maximum Value of Turnover Tax (multiple in relation to wholesale price)	Interval Number	Amount of Wholesale Price, rubles	Maximum Value of Turnover Tax (multiple in relation to wholesale price)
1	0.02	25	11	20.48	15
2	0.04	24	12	40.96	14
3	0.08	23	13	81.92	13
4	0.16	22	14	163.84	12
5	0.32	21	15	327.68	11
6	0.64	20	16	655.36	10
7	1.28	19	17	1310.72	9
8	2.56	18	18	2621.44	8
9	5.12	17	19	5242.88	7
10	10.24	16			

The goods were grouped by the amount of the wholesale price (all the price lists were analyzed for the state retail and corresponding wholesale prices as approved by the Goskomsenas [State Price Committee] of the USSR and all Union republics as of 1 January 1989). Within each obtained group, a commodity was isolated having the maximum amount of turnover tax. Thus, the table reflects the maximum (relative) amount of turnover tax for each interval. However, since the system existing in the USSR for state retail prices is far from fully conforming to value (the aggregate of socially necessary expenditures), the consumer and exchange value of the consumer goods, the table has been adjusted considering the difference between the wholesale and sales price of certain goods on the so-called black market. As the additional information source, we used a poll (n = 121) and this performed an auxiliary and simultaneously control function.

The respondent was to reply to what degree he would agree to overpay for a thing which he needed greatly but which was almost impossible to find. Each respondent was offered three or four figures (the prices from Table 1, Column 2). The total was divided by the amount of the price and the obtained result represented a sort of relative maximum for the amount of the turnover tax.

Among these responses they also took the maximum values of the "overpayments."

All three measurements (price lists, the "black market" and poll) underlay the constructed dependence. In terms of the line of its main trend, it was leveled out and idealized. Incidentally, the given measurement, of course, is approximate and should rather prove the presence of the phenomenon than give it a maximally precise description. As is seen from Table 1, the ratio of the good's wholesale price to the maximum (relative) value of the turnover tax is subordinate to a definite law and with a geometric rise in the former, the relative value of the latter diminishes uniformly.

The mathematical processing of the obtained result has shown that the discovered link between the amount of the wholesale price and the maximum of the relative turnover tax amount can be described by the formula:

$$Y = 26 - (2 + \lg X) / \lg 2,$$

where Y—the maximum relative (multiple) amount of the turnover tax; X—the amount of the wholesale price in rubles; 26 and 2—empirically calculated constants.

In order to find out at what maximum price it is possible to sell one or another scarce commodity, it is necessary to substitute in the formula the amount of the wholesale price of the given good in rubles in the place of X and multiply the result (Y) by the wholesale price of the given good.

An analysis of the given empirical data shows that the consumer and exchange value are relative amounts and depend upon the wholesale price and hence cannot have their own independent absolute value.

### How Much Does Justice Cost?

However, the question of how to measure the consumer-exchange index remains moot. One of the possible approaches is to measure using a sociological method as is partially apparent from what was stated above. The designated index has two parameters: the consumer value and the ratio of supply and demand. They possess the ability for a directly proportional interaction in both directions of increase the decrease. Consequently, this is a class of problems of measurement which can be solved

by the logical square method [6]. Since, as is clear, the consumer-exchange index is a relative amount in relation to the wholesale price (value), the measurement can be made in the following manner. The respondent is asked two questions: 1. How great is your desire to purchase the given good? 2. How scarce is the given good? Clearly, the first question measures consumer value<sup>2</sup> while the second measures the ratio of supply and demand. The answers were processed according to the logical square method and as a result of this values were obtained for the consumer-exchange index (see Table 2). Further its amounts (from 1 to 8) must be normed relative to the values of the maximum (relative) amount of the turnover tax (from 7 to 25, see Table 1, Column 3). The largest value of the consumer-exchange index (8 points) was equated to the relative amount of the turnover tax of one or another good in accord with its wholesale price and in this manner we determined the weight of one point for the consumer-exchange index. Proceeding from this, the maximum value was derived for the turnover tax of a specific good with the given amount of the index.

**Table 2: Scheme for Constructing Consumer-Exchange Index**

How Great Is Your Desire to Purchase Given Good	Degree of Good Scarcity				
	Virtually Never in Free Sale	Sold Very Rarely	Sold Rarely	Sold With Short Breaks	Virtually Always for Sale
Extremely great	8	7	6	5	4
Very great	7	6	5	4	3
Rather great	6	5	4	3	2
Possible to think about buying	5	4	3	2	1
Do not want to buy good	0	0	0	0	0

Thus, it is possible to propose (although somewhat schematically) an algorithm for defining (measuring) the amount of the retail price on the basis of the three key price-forming factors of value (the aggregate of socially necessary expenditures), consumer value and the ratio of supply and demand. Such an algorithm combines economic and sociological methods. The wholesale price is determined on the basis of the costs and a standard profit. Its value is substituted into the above-given formula and as a result one obtains an interval within which the amount of the turnover tax can fluctuate for a good having one or another wholesale price. Then, as a result of measuring the consumer-exchange index and its norming, an approximate amount of turnover tax is set for the given good, with a specific amount of its consumer value and ratio of supply and demand.

Here, of course, the question arises of social justice in the sphere of retail price formation. Should the maximum amount of the turnover tax (the maximum possible retail price) be set in all instances and is this just in relation to the consumer?

The notion of "just prices" which has become widespread over the last several decades in our nation in its essence derives from the notion of just distribution which has become deep-rooted in the public mind. The theoretically proclaimed basic principle of distribution under socialism "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor" in practice has been warped by two circumstances: in the first place, by the desire to embody in life the ideal of just distribution inherent to Utopian socialism ("everything that there is should be shared equally among all) and, secondly, by the egocentric aspirations of the ruling elite.

Being one of the main transmission mechanisms in the distribution system, the retail price subsystem fully corresponds to the existing leveling notions of justice. For this reason, one of the main functions of the retail price system is leveling. It is realized, as is known, in the following manner: prices for a significant portion of the products (the so-called vital necessities) are set below their value while for goods of prestige consumption and in increased demands ("luxury items") this is much higher than the wholesale price. In other words, in second instance a high turnover tax is set (sometimes

surpassing by several-fold the amount of the wholesale price. A portion of this does to subsidize the production of the unprofitable (loss-producing) vital necessities. Thus, in purchasing "luxury articles" the high-income population groups thereby partially pay for the cost of the goods which are acquired by the less-well-off strata.

At present, social justice in the sphere of distribution is more and more often interpreted as the successive realization of the principle of "to each according to his labor" with the socioeconomic protection of the low-income categories. In this context, social justice in the price formation sphere assumes a different content. A solution to the problem is seen in the following. With the aid of the corresponding methods, the notorious "line of poverty" is finally "seen off." For all consumer goods prices are set no lower than their cost and this inevitably involves a rise in the prices. The total by which the increase occurs should be balanced off by monetary compensation in income in such a manner that the less well-off population groups are not below the line of poverty. Here they propose introducing a system of retail prices (and, correspondingly, a structure of consumer goods) which has a great differentiation from the viewpoint of the amount of the consumer value of the goods.

As for the turnover tax, it is not set on goods which ensure a standard of living not lower than the poverty line (that is, of sufficient quality but comparatively low consumer value), while it is collected on goods of the same sort but having great consumer value and the amount of it grows proportionally to the consumer value. In other words, a great differentiation in prices (for goods of the same sort) should correspond to a great differentiation in wages (income). This not only will make it possible to provide a satisfactory standard of living for the citizens with low income, but will also play an incentive role. This is the question of such a phenomenon of economic behavior as the desire of the individual to move to a superior consumer group. In a situation of strictly carrying out the principle of "to each according to his labor," it will be possible to realize such an aspiration only due to increased labor productivity. Thus, the retail price system will perform the functions of social protection and the strengthening of labor efficiency.

#### Footnotes

1. Historical information: in Russia, the excise tax was established in 1838 for tobacco, in 1848 for sugar, in 1862 for salt, in 1863 for alcoholic beverages (instead of a system of drinking fees which existed beginning in the 16th Century) and so forth. At present in the USSR, the turnover tax is collected on products of over 20 sectors and subsectors of industry (perfume-cosmetic, liquor-vodka, confectionery, textile, tobacco, footwear and so forth).
2. The proposed method is based on the characteristics of consumer value given by K. Marx "value determined by opinion" [1]. For more detail on the measuring of consumer value, see the monograph by G.G. Azgaldov devoted especially to this problem [2].

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### POLITICS. DEMOCRACY. THE INDIVIDUAL.

#### Who Will Become a Deputy?

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[Article by Viktor Grigoryevich Britvin, doctor of philosophical sciences and leader of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion and deputy director of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The constructing of a socialist state under the law is impossible without fully restoring the power of the soviets, without fundamental changes in the very foundations of their formation, without developing initiative and strengthening the interest of the voters in the course and results of the voting. At the same time, the difficulties of perestroyka have dampened the optimism concerning the merits and immutability of the individual structures of power and the mechanisms of their formation and functioning and have forced a more sober and critical view of the entire aggregate of social and political institutions in our society and their ability to realize and reconcile the interests of the different groups of the populace.

The crisis of the traditional structures has sharply accelerated the dynamics of political life and there is an active process underway of forming its principals, including new ones and their elaboration of programs and the search for "their own" position. In this situation, when the moods and opinions of large masses of people are

being shaped through the clash of different interests, it is important to know what will determine the conduct of the basic groups of potential voters in the elections to the republic and local soviets. In order to correctly set the tactics, it is essential to have a clear notion of to which social groups the possible candidates can appeal, whom the public intends to support in the future and how the existing social background can reflect on the attitudes and conduct of the voters.

Co-workers from the Center for the Study of Public Opinion under the IS AN SSSR [Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] have endeavored to obtain answers to the mentioned questions. In July 1989, around 1,460 persons were questioned in Alama-Ata, Volgograd, Kutaisi, Moscow and Riga. In this number were 856 workers, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel employed in the sphere of industrial production. The replies by this group of respondents are answered in the current article. In addition, materials have been used from other polls conducted by the Center including in Moscow in April 1989 (N = 425 persons) and in July (N = 830 persons).

It is not difficult to assume that the starting point for the scale of voter judgments was the elections of the USSR people's deputies and the work of the Congress itself. Its importance without any doubt goes beyond the framework of the adopted decisions. From the viewpoint of our subject, it is fundamentally important that the Congress destroyed the model which had been in effect for a long time in our nation of charismatic leadership. This was a major accomplishment of both the deputies who overcame their timidity as well as the leadership of the state itself which did not fear to act in the role of the object of critical statements which were transmitted directly throughout the world. The Congress became a most important channel for shaping and considering public opinion.

What was the attitude of the respondents toward the Congress? Some 34 percent constantly watched its work and 60 percent saw or heard the broadcasts periodically. Just 4 percent did not. These data agree with the results of telephone polls conducted by the Congress Group of the IS AN SSSR. The great interest in the work of the Congress did not mean that the assessments of the results of its work were as high. Only 8 percent of those questioned assumed that the Congress took a significant step forward along the path of the revolutionary renewal of society; 13 percent pointed out that regardless of certain problems it nevertheless successfully carried out the tasks confronting it. Some 17 percent of the respondents did not put any particular hopes on the Congress and its results confirmed the initial assumptions. The largest proportional amount (39 percent) of the critical individuals felt that things would not be moved forward by the discussions at the Congress; 17 percent were not satisfied with how the deputies defended the interests of their voters. An analysis of the data by regions and from the viewpoint of the socioprofessional affiliation of the

respondents did not disclose statistically significant differences in the judgments. Only one indicator was essential in this regard, party affiliation. Among the CPSU members and candidate members, the share of optimistic views was approximately 1.5-2-fold greater than among the nonparty persons.

### **I Vote for the Individual!**

The decisive factors in choosing the candidate were: the attractiveness of the electoral program (40 percent of those questioned were guided by this) and the personal qualities of the candidate (36 percent). At the same time, a good number of persons (19 percent) chose a specific candidate because he was not a party member.

What arguments by the candidates primarily attracted voters? Sympathy by 46 percent of those questioned was aroused by an uncompromising view by the candidate of the severe economic straits of the nation, including providing the public with industrial goods and food products (38 percent). For 25 percent, criticism of bureaucracy was important. Analysis by the candidates of the reasons for the slow development of democracy and the lack of glasnost on the spot attracted, respectively, 19 percent and 10 percent of the respondents. The most effective means for influencing the position of the voters evidently was the print organs. In any event, 1/3 of those questioned linked their choice precisely with the setting out of the candidate programs on the pages of the press. For 17 percent of the respondents, the main role was played by the holding of television debates; for an equal number it was information gained from leaflets and appeals; for 15 percent, participation in meetings. From 6 to 12 percent of the voters took their decision under the influence of the arguments of supporters of the candidate, meetings as well as radio talks by the candidates.

In turning to the experience of the recent elections, one must not overlook the fact that, regardless of their importance and the unusual nature of the present political situation, a significantly smaller number of voters participated in them than before. The results of the poll on this question (85 percent of the respondents had participated in the voting) were close to the official data. Something else is alarming here: an even smaller number of persons, some 61 percent, intends to participate in the elections for the republic and local soviets. Of this number, around 13 percent has already taken such a decision and 23 percent as yet have not given it any thought.

Another important feature of the current situation is that the traditional sociostatus system for forming the group of candidates is virtually not working. Thus, only 26 percent of those questioned preferred a candidate from the workers. Around 16 percent preferred to vote for the representatives of scientists, journalists and writers. Some 9 percent were oriented to the people's fronts and other independent organizations. Some 8 percent of the respondents were ready to choose leaders of industrial

enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and 5 percent of the respondents wanted peasants. From 2 to 4 percent proposed supporting leaders of the party bodies and executive committees of the local soviets and the leading Komsomol and trade union workers. In evaluating these data, it is essential to recall again that at the previous elections for a majority of those questioned, the leading criteria of preference for one or another candidate were his program and personal qualities. And in a hypothetical situation these

aspects came to the forefront. More than ½ of those questioned (57 percent) pointed to the professional, personal qualities of the candidate and not his official status as being the main things for them. If one compares the data of the spring and summer surveys in Moscow, it can be concluded with confidence that the significance of the "personality" criterion in electing a candidate deputy has intensified even more (see the table). In a word, in the forthcoming election campaign the mentioned factor will play a dominating role.

**Distribution of Answers to the Question "In the Elections Do You Intend to Support a Candidate Who Represents Which Social Group?"**

**(A Respondent Could Mark Several Positions)**

Social Status of Preferred Candidate	April 1989	July 1989
Worker	27	15
Peasant	10	3
Representative of intelligentsia (scientist, journalist, writer and so forth)	34	19
Economic leader	12	5
Leading party worker	7	2
Leading worker of local soviet executive committee	3	1
Leading Komsomol worker	5	1
Leading trade union worker	3	1
Serviceman	—*	3
Candidate from people's fronts and other independent organizations	—*	4
For me the professional, personal qualities of the candidate are the main ones and not his sociovocational affiliation	57	74

\* Position missing.

A noteworthy feature in the current political situation is the rise and active work of the people's fronts, the informal movements and organizations. One-third of those questioned favored their involvement in the elections; some 26 percent supported them in some ways and in some ways not, with 17 percent against. Around 8 percent of the respondents were indifferent to the involvement of such organizations in the election campaign, and 14 percent had not yet determined their position. The greatest sympathy for the informal groups was shown by engineers and technicians, and here the share of their supporters reached 40 percent. Among workers there were 29 percent and white collar personnel 24 percent. Without going into the reasons for the existing situation, let us point out that the independent movements are presently more popular than the traditional institutions of power. Thus, in answering the question of what organization has the greatest authority among the population of a city (rayon), 14 percent mentioned the party organization and its leading bodies, while around ½ of those questioned felt that the independent associations did.

**Time to Gather Rocks**

This fact merits attention also because due to various factors there has been a tendency for a decline in party authority and the indications of this were noted even in the polls conducted by the center on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and soon after the conclusion of its work. A spiritual upswelling which accompanied the preparations for the party forum and the expectation of positive results were the dominating motive in the views of the workers at that time. More than ½ of the questioned workers, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel at that time linked a strengthening of the authority and influence of the party in society with the holding of the conference. Approximately 1/5 voiced the opinion that the results of the conference would not reflect on party authority and only 3 percent assumed that the prestige and role of the party would decline over the long run. A poll after the conference showed further unfavorable shifts in mass awareness. Just 23 percent of the respondents pointed to increased authority and influence of the party, 37 percent felt that the situation had not changed in any way, while 17 percent judged the situation negatively. The drop in public mood is

explained primarily by the fact that positive shifts in the economic area and to a definite degree in the political area occur slowly and in certain regards the situation after the conference even deteriorated.

The data of the last research show that in the mass mind a critical mood continues to build. Some 63 percent feel that the authority and influence of the party are declining while 1/4 of those questioned does not see any changes here. We would point out that the most critically inclined are the engineers, technicians and white collar personnel.

An extremely varied view in the mass mind is taken of the constitutional guarantee of the role of the CPSU as the leading and guiding force in Soviet society. Only 14 percent of those questioned considered such a situation completely correct, 29 percent favored a change in the wording of this article, while 40 percent favored its exclusion from the USSR Constitution. The supporters of the "status quo" were found most among the communists while radical moods were characteristic of nonparty persons. The question of the status of the CPSU is inseparably linked to the problem of multiple parties in the nation. What do the respondents think about this? Some 36 percent feel that true democracy can be achieved only under the conditions of a multiparty system, while 37 percent supported the opinion that the number of parties in and of itself does not determine the level of democracy. Some 15 percent did not support the idea of a multiparty system.

The decline in party authority is one of the main reasons for the nonelection of many party representatives running locally as USSR people's deputies. This was the opinion of 38 percent of those questioned. There is another viewpoint that the defeat was due to an increased critical attitude on the part of the population toward the party apparatus (24 percent). Some 19 percent saw the reason in the insufficient personal authority of the party workers put up as candidate deputies. Some 15 percent of those questioned supported the opinion that it was not so much a question of the attitude toward the party or party apparatus as it was the dissatisfaction of the people with the pace of perestroika.

In working out the election platform, the party organizations must consider the position of the potential voters on the matter of one person's combining the posts of party committee secretary and soviet chairman. The current research, like our previous polls, confirms that society maintains a dubious attitude toward the idea of combining the posts of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. One out of every 11 favored such a step as absolutely necessary; 38 percent of those questioned assumed that such a decision is admissible under current conditions but in the future, when perestroika becomes irreversible, it must be abandoned. Around 40 percent were convinced that the practice of combining posts must be abandoned even now. As for the combining of the posts of party committee secretary and soviet

chairman on the oblast, city and rayon levels, some 12 percent consider this advisable, while 68 percent of those questioned were decisively against.

Interesting data were also obtained on other aspects in the work of the future soviets and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In the mass awareness there are shifts in favor of establishing factions (associations) of deputies here. One-third of those questioned felt that this was an indispensable condition for the effective work of the congresses and sessions. It is worthy of note that the opinion of the CPSU members and candidate members, on the one hand, and the nonparty persons, on the other, coincide on this question. Some 18 percent of those questioned in principle permit the possibility of such factions, although they do not consider this obligatory. Some 21 percent, in supporting a pluralism of opinions, does not feel that any factions or associations of deputies are essential for carrying it out; some 17 percent were against factions, assuming that the main condition for the successful work of the congresses or sessions lay in the unity of the people's deputies.

#### A Hard Struggle Ahead

The sociopolitical situation is a contradictory one. There are evermore reasons to view the crisis situation as a protracted process. At present, even insignificant deteriorations tell immediately on public opinion and moods. More and more often extremely dangerous centers of tension arise as a consequence of the increased interethnic contradictions, labor conflicts and so forth.

In the given situation, the attitude of the public to what is happening will be more and more differentiated. Support for the idea of the need for perestroika in society cannot help but undergo changes, both as a consequence of the clarifying of its goals and a more profound understanding of the problems as well as because a significant portion of the public has not received the expected goods which would lead to a rise in the standard of living. The difficulties of the economic reform, the growing deficit, the increased cost of living and the exacerbation of traditional problems on the job and at the place of residence undermine the authority of the progressive reform initiatives and reduce the trust in the authorities which should act as the organizers of the revolutionary changes.

The significant interest of the public in the measures unsanctioned by the local authorities and initiated more often by the leaders of independent social associations (and, incidentally, for other spontaneous meetings and demonstrations) provide grounds to assume that during the period of the election campaign, unsanctioned mass actions can be encouraged by the very situation of competition and debate which will accompany the struggle for the deputy places. The recent mass strikes of the miners confirm the high probability of such development of events.

Naturally, the diverse independent social associations and informal organizations will endeavor to provide maximum information to the public on their programs and propose their own candidate deputies. Such claims have serious grounds, considering the support by a significant part of the public for the informal groups as well as the widespread opinion that the candidate deputies should be proposed by meetings of citizens at stadiums, squares and other mass meeting areas; 1 out of 4 is in favor of organizing the collecting of signatures in favor of persons who are going to run in the aim of including them on the list of candidates (the data of a poll of around 1,000 workers from a number of large industrial enterprises in March-April 1988).

Without claiming broad generalization and in recognizing a definite limitation in the data obtained as a result of probing public opinion, it can be concluded nevertheless that with a very broad spectrum of judgments concerning complex and contradictory processes in the economy and political sphere, the optimistic note is beginning to give way to a pessimistic one.

In the forthcoming campaign for elections to the republic and local soviets, the situation of the candidates from the party organizations as, incidentally, from the other official institutions, will clearly become more complex.

The elections of the soviet chairmen could be the most dramatic. Under the conditions of increased criticism against the party and its bodies, the notion of the unconditional realization of the principle of combining the posts of the first leaders—party and soviet—can lead to a situation where there may be only an insignificant part of the communists and party committee first secretaries among the first soviet leaders. The principle of combining jobs on the level of the local soviets should be applied more flexibly, considering the existing situation and the specific features of the regions. Attention must also be paid to the legislating of the appropriate election practices.

A fundamental change in the attitude toward the party and its candidates naturally can occur with the start of tangible changes in the economy and primarily in the supply of foodstuffs and industrial vital necessities, together with noticeable shifts on the question of establishing social justice. This does not mean that the success of the party in the election campaign will not depend upon the quality of its conduct or upon the level of the organizational and ideological work. Greater responsibility must be shown toward working out the election program of the candidates from the party organizations and the preelection campaign. Considering the high popularity of the printed word among the voters, particular attention must be paid to the soundness, concreteness and realisticness of the election programs published by the party candidates.

The increased influence of the informal organizations, the possible deterioration in the economic situation and interethnic relations as well as the increase in labor

conflicts can tell negatively on party authority as the vanguard of progressive changes in society. This may be felt but this is not for certain. For now, in our view, in public opinion and attitudes there is a prevailing not so much of a critical view of the party per se, as rather the notion of seeking out principals in the political process who would best meet the developing needs and expectations of the people. Here the principal of the political process who satisfies the voter is not the representative of the official organization but rather the agent of a definite program of activity, an individual or personality not burdened down by the dogmas of the past but rather capable of bold independent action, sensing and knowing the current and long-term problems and needs of society, groups and individuals. Under the conditions of the further ideological and political pluralization of society, this circumstance will assume ever-greater weight.

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### The Ecological Movement

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[Text] Changes in social life have moved ecology up among the most acute problems. A mass ecological movement has arisen and this has articulated one of the main, in my view, social contradictions between the self-contained bureaucratic "ecosystem" and the rest of life outside it. It is becoming ever-clearer that this "ecosystem" has grown up and organized its own well-being by exploiting the entire living environment and depleting its replenishable human and natural resources. The ecological movements have set as their task the defense of a key value: human life. It is far from accidental that the ecological initiatives have provided an impetus for the forming of such mass organizations as the people's fronts; the ecomovements already have their own history, traditions, leaders and extensive contacts, and most importantly, a constructive focus and a close tie with an independent science. Finally, it is fundamentally important that these movements to the highest degree are oriented at changing the value system. In this sense, they are the most radical in comparison with the other civil initiatives.

Unfortunately, our sociology has been virtually disarmed when confronted with the stormy empire of civil initiatives and protest actions as there is no developed notion of collective action under the conditions of socialism, let alone a theory of new mass social movements. The fact that for a long time we did not have the corresponding empirical material (or we did not wish to notice this?) cannot serve as justification. In order to overcome this barrier, it is essential to turn to the arsenal of world, including the so-called environmental sociology.

### Theoretical Bases of the Analysis

The initial theoretical dilemma going back to the works of N. Smelser and A. Touraine is seemingly rather simple: either the social system gives rise and "produces" collective action or it [the action] does the same for society [1, 2]. If the former is correct, then the ecological movement must be described simply as a normal "social deviation" for society, as a populist or romantic protest. But if the latter is correct, then this movement is a force capable of influencing the transformation of our society.

The question posed in this manner cannot be resolved purely theoretically and it is essential to turn to the facts of history. Up to now, a majority of the social movements in our nation—both the protest movements and the innovative ones—have been in essence supplements to the existing administrative system. They could be viewed as indicators of maturing social problems which were used by the system for broadening or altering the sphere of social control carried out by the system. The presence of such indicators was beneficial for the system as it helped it to adapt to the changing situation. The experience of the United States and Western Europe shows that the governments, parties and legislative bodies of these countries learned a great deal from the ecological movement [3]. But our administrative-command system is a degrading system and until recently the notion of teaching it was alien [4]. One of the main reasons for this was the monopoly which prevented the appearance of any independent social principals whatsoever. Correspondingly, its own structure and the structures subordinate to it had a clearly expressed "mobilizational" (army, hierarchical) character. Theoretically, there could be no normal, that is, spontaneously organizing, social ecosystems. Of course, in practical terms they did exist but were concealed deep within the system.

In the course of perestroika, a qualitatively different situation has begun to develop with collective principals of action appearing and broadening their activity independently of this system. As this is so, it is important to understand whether they are merely a protest reaction or carry a serious, society-transforming charge, claiming thereby the role of a social movement?

There are various viewpoints concerning the criteria of such a difference [5]. In our view, the main ones here are:

1) the type of collective identification (the basis of the inner integration), 2) the organizational base and resource base, 3) the presence of a social principal and an antagonist, 4) the nature of the "problem field" for the interaction of the opposing principals. Let us endeavor to examine our ecological movements from these positions.

What is the basis of their collective identification? Clearly, here the integrating feature is not a class affiliation. Nor is it (although this is important) a territorial affiliation and age and vocational criteria are not applicable. The integrating feature of these movements must be sought out in the sociopsychological sphere, in their goals and values. In contrast to other social principals, where the aim of activity is rationalization (a change in the existing economic system or more just distribution relations), the ecological movements focus on maintaining the "world of life" with man being a part of this, that is, all of us. Correspondingly, these demands are addressed not only "outside" (to the economic and political institutions) but primarily to themselves and the immediate group around. "If not I, then who?" "Without us this problem cannot be solved"—such motives are very typical for the ecological activists. Speaking in favor of a sociopsychological basis of integration is also the fact of the rise of these movements on an interpersonal basis, the prevalence of interpersonal contacts and the selection of participants by human qualities. Subjective satisfaction (inner gratification) from the activity itself is a major motivating factor. Another integrating value is independence (in a small group) and the possibility independently of opposing and achieving specific goals. The movement also has a definite "we are the model" as they conceive of themselves as the protector of the living world against the encroachments of the administrative-command system.

A second important feature of the ecomovement is that in contrast to the administrative-command system, it is not against this milieu but, on the contrary, is rooted in it; its entire organization is antibureaucratic and is based on autonomous cells, horizontal ties and forms of direct democracy. But possibly the most important thing is that the movement has given rise to new socioecological cells on the spot, in the cities, rural localities and throughout society. Of course, a transitional situation is full of drama. On the one hand, these cells (as elements of civil society) are the first swallows of "normal" social ecology. On the other, as support groups for the republic and national movements (people's fronts and others) they become the most politicized cells of the social milieu and consequently again acquire a "mobilizing" character.

The third feature of the ecomovement is the presence of a social principal opposing it. This is the administrative-command system against which the ecomovement has waged an outright struggle in recent years. The designated circumstance distinguishes it from the nature conservation movements the activities of which have not touched the foundations of the system. At present, the participants of the ecomovement have realized that the

main enemy is not pesticides, not the equipment, but rather the system employing them. Indicatively, the people's fronts of Estonia, Latvia and others have largely emerged out of protest actions against moves which showed a complete disregard for the life of people and nature in entire regions.

Finally and fourthly, where are the nexus of conflict of the opposing forces and the center of gravity of their opposition. Initially, the ecological groups and movements fought for control over the actions of the administrative system (the locating of new nuclear power plants, enterprises, mines and the construction of canals). In time, the focus shifted into the sphere of criticizing the existing principles for the planning, financing and placing of the productive forces and the supercentralization of decision taking, that is, toward a criticism of the system itself. At present, a struggle is developing over the fundamental goals and values. This is a principle, key point.

### Goals and Values

The value guidelines of the ecological movement do not come down merely to the conservation of nature and resource saving. In the literature it is usually the question of a paradigm representing the aggregate of positions on the key problems of social development: the relations of man with nature and other humans, toward technology and the economy and to the principles of social organization and political life [6-8]. For this reason, it can be called the paradigm for the primacy of common human values. The latter circumstance predetermines its universal nature. However, in actuality it is possible to have a whole spectrum of its interpretations, since the social and cultural context within which it was established varies. The interpretation proposed below of the environmental paradigm is given in terms of the conditions of our reality.

*Nature is an independent value.* Man is a part of the biological systems which support social life and for this reason the latter should not violate the laws of nature. Man should return his "due" to it, that is, restore, maintain and reproduce the ecosystems destroyed by him.

*Relations with other people, interethnic and international relations.* On the banner of the ecomovement are mutual tolerance and empathy, dialogue and partnership, cooperation instead of confrontation. There is concern not only for "near ones" but also "distant ones," for all. There is a requisite assessment of any of one's action from the viewpoint of its consequences for coming generations.

*Attitude toward technological development.* Any technological innovation has a human and natural price (risk) and this should be minimal. New technologies should be built into the natural systems, without destroying but merely lengthening the natural cycles. Priority is given to soft, biologically compatible technologies.

*Principles of economic development.* The economy is merely a means of satisfying rational human requirements. There is no production for the sake of production! Ecological stability is the prime criterion of economic development. Resource saving should become a standard of culture.

*Social organization.* A populated, diverse and safe environment is an increasingly important resource of the socioreproduction processes, for the formation and transmission of ecological values. The quality of human life depends not only upon the amount of consumption but also upon the possibility of working rationally, taking decisions independently and having the support of others. A man should have roots in nature and in culture and these survive only in the instance that those who protect and cultivate them are alive. The more diverse the national cultures and natural landscapes, the higher the social potential of society.

*Principles of political life.* Glasnost and public control in all spheres of social activity, consistent decentralization of production and decision-taking, the development of self-management and forms of direct democracy and the obligation of working out long-range forecasts and alternative plans in taking economic and social decisions. The converting of the "ecological imperatives" (external constraints) into the values and standards of culture is an important task in cultural policy.

Of course, all of this is precisely principles and value guidelines. However, even now they have begun to be embodied in life in certain places. Let us take the program of the Estonian People's Front. At present, there is a complicated sociopolitical situation in the republic. However, one cannot help but see that all nine sections of the program ultimately are oriented toward man and toward creating a safe and worthy habitat. The People's Front itself is a movement founded on civil initiatives. Its goal is to construct a socialist society on the principles of democracy and humanism, decentralization and self-government by the people. In accord with the program of the People's Front, the economy should be human and ecological and the political system should be tolerant of different opinions and activities of any, including political, independent associations. The urban environment should be humane, preserving of traditions and contributing to a restoration of cultural and religious dignity. In the area of human rights, there are all guarantees for the inviolability of the individual, property, home and correspondence. "The People's Front," states the program, "strives for a moral purification of society and a rebirth based on freedom of the individual, morality, honesty, goodwill, conscience, honor, shame and justice." It is specially emphasized that "the place of man in society is determined by the level of his education, vocational skill and initiative" [9].

However, it is a rather long distance from the declarations to their embodiment. Certainly, the administrative system over many decades has also proclaimed its principles. Will the mass movements become a creative

transforming force leading to a reassessment of previous values or will they remain merely a protest? On the one hand, the program of the Estonian People's Front and certain other ecological movements provide such a hope. On the other, the goals of national rebirth and self-preservation and an intense struggle for the sovereignty of the republics in which precisely national and territorial interests become the consolidating element can, under certain conditions, turn this struggle into a variety of nationalistic or populist movements.

But still there is reason to hope that precisely the ecological movements can become the agent of a changing system of values in the above-indicated sense. This is why. First of all, ecovalues are actually tantamount to the primacy of humanistic values and human needs. This is also clear theoretically as man reproduces in a certain environment, and at present masses of people have understood this truth in practice. Secondly, these values are not burdened down by the past but rather have a strictly positive hue in the eyes of the people. They are the least politicized and if they do cause political actions, they are headed by persons respected in the people such as S. Zalygin, V. Rasputin, D. Likhachev and A. Yablokov.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the inertia in the economic system and the dominance of antiecolological values, the ecological situation for a long time to come will deteriorate and, consequently, tension will rise in society. And not only in the city but also in the countryside as it will take decades to restore the spoiled lands.

Fourthly, regardless of the great emotional charge which the ecological initiatives carry, in comparison with others they are the most professional and scientific. Here common human values draw close to scientific truths. Precisely the ecomovements are least subjected to group or any other parochial interests.


Fifthly, these movements are the most international with all the ensuing advantages of the international exchange of knowledge, information, the possibility of conducting joint actions and so forth. It must be remembered that if we dally too long in terms of an ecological reorientation of production, then the world and primarily Western Europe will simply demand this from us as the danger of the repetition of Chernobyl or other large-scale accidents is too great.

Finally and sixthly, under the conditions of such a fundamental change occurring in our society, there is a growing need among the people for points of support, including in the ideological sphere. Universal "ecologization" is presently becoming such an ideology and in the eyes of many, many people it is particularly attractive in that it is not a rigid and not a politicized ideology.

#### The Balance of Forces

Ecologists realize that major social changes are needed to achieve their goals. Their antagonists, in developing

#### System of Orientation for the Activity of Social Subjects



1. Orientation to Man  
(Preservation of Nature)
2. Orientation to Maintaining  
the Status Quo
3. Orientation to Social Change
4. Orientation to Production  
for the Sake of Production

their own system of "production for the sake of production" (for the sake of the "gross," the plan and so forth), naturally fight to preserve an order of things advantageous to them. The aggregate of views arising in the given context can be represented as a definite system of coordinates (see the diagram). Let us use the obtained scheme for analyzing the balance of forces in the ecological movement.

Let us examine initially the diagonal "administrative-command system" (ACS)—"ecologists" (quadrants I-III). One cannot help but see that the supporters and representatives of the ACS are consistent opponents of the goals and values of the ecomovement. For the former, nature is merely a means for ensuring the existence of the system and for the latter, an object of protective and reproduction actions. For the former, relations with other persons are typical "organizational relations" based upon an hierarchical subordination and role interactions. In them there is no room for altruism or concern for "distant ones," be these neighbors at home or subsequent generations. The ecologists are not only more humane and human but are socially active. Over there there are "members of the organization" and over here there are "citizens."

While for the former technology is merely a tool for strengthening the might of the apparatus, for the latter it is an object of constant reflection, improvement and safe use. For the ACS which has created an economy of wastefulness and scarcity which is advantageous for us, ecologically safe technology is empty noise while resource saving methods are already a threat to their own well-being. The positions of the sides are equally radically different in terms of science. For the ACS, science is a departmental tool of self-defense and for the ecomovement a source for forming a new system of values;

without ecological knowledge it is impossible to have either new thinking, the elaboration of a strategy for solving regional problems or the further development of culture, both high and daily.

Their views are also opposite on the organization and development of the social sphere. Over the decades of its existence, the administrative system established a powerful machine for exploiting the natural and human resources of the nation. In fact, they viewed it merely as a source of their own life support. And hence, the growing pollution of the natural environment and the degradation of the social infrastructure, as well as the complete disregard for national cultures, the unique natural landscapes, the historical monuments and local traditions. Alien to the ideologists of the administrative system is the notion of social reproduction and its environment and linked to specific persons and groups and their real concerns. Here they are concerned solely with the "labor force" and the "working masses." In contrast to the ecomovement which arise on a sociopsychological basis and is a mass movement of individuals, the administrative system has always worked just with the "masses," in exploiting their natural human desires and then throwing them to the whims of fate, as was done with the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] and scores of other "construction sites of communism."

Probably, the most grievous heritage of the administrative system is the creation of a new type of personality: a person without roots, a hired worker, a time-server and narrow minded person devoid of responsibility and ties. The ecologists endeavor to oppose his anticulture and nomadic psychology with the values of reasoned, creative labor, human mutual aid and solidarity, as well as developed methods of moral encouragement and remuneration. Western sociologists call their ecologists the bearers of postmaterial values. Since our society has not gone through the stage of developed industrialism, I feel that it would be more correct to say that our ecologists actively contribute to the discovery in society of oases where common human values are cultivated.

Finally, there are obvious differences in the sides in relation to the political sphere. The ecomovement opposes the administrative system in its nature, as it has grown up from below, out of the citizen initiatives, it operates openly and publically, by methods of direct democracy, and is in favor of independent experts and alternate planning. The administrative system, on the contrary, cannot exist without an atmosphere of secrecy, "pocket" experts, the fetishizing of plans ("a plan at any price") and other attributes of bureaucratic rule.

Thus, to put it briefly, a closed system opposes a mass movement, the disposer of the available natural resources oppose a force favoring their reproduction, the egoists and localists oppose the altruists and globalists, the conservatives oppose the innovators and reformers and the bearers of apparat values oppose the defenders of common human ones.

The question arises as to who at present makes up these two forces? At first glance, in any event in terms of the administrative system, the reply is a simple one. However, it is essential to consider that there always is a "core" or the protector and expresser of the corresponding system of values and an extensive "periphery."

As a whole, quadrant III is the ecological niche of the administrative system and, consequently, of all three groups which hold key positions in terms of the planning and allocation of all types of resources in our society. In the given category are influential groups in the ministries and departments, the local authorities of various levels in the collectives of departmental science, the trade union organizations and, of course, in the planning bodies. The fact that a majority of them is honest and ordinary people, in principle, changes nothing. These persons are the consumers of scarce resources and they construct their well-being on a socially unjust system of their allocation and pursue their own narrow group interest. This is the "core" of the system. Its periphery is extraordinarily broad. It is comprised of two different contingents of people. The first is those who serve it zealously, as this provides material goods and vertical mobility. In the given category are chiefly the workers of the middle and lower management level of the party, state, trade union and other apparatus, the workers of off-limits enterprises and the military. We would point out that their territorial shifts, as a rule, are a condition of vertical mobility. So that in relation to a specific town, rural rayon or generally any habitat, such persons are temporary by definition. At the current stage, here we would also have to put many cooperative members. The second contingent is made up of persons dependent upon the system: by law (servicemen) or because of the absence of choice. These also are an enormous army of persons in the "nomadic" professions such as expedition members, drilling rig workers, land reclamation workers, power construction workers and employees of transport and the extracting industry.

Who comprises the core of the opposite I quadrant? Even from the two characteristics (adherence to the ecological paradigm and opposition to the administrative system), much can be said about the persons comprising it. And here again it is essential to recall the importance of the social context. Thus, in the United States, Great Britain and West Germany, among the activists in the movement there are more women and those employed in the service sector of the economy, the representatives of the ecomovement are younger and more educated than their antagonists but are more poorly provided for, they better understand ecological problems but have a poorer notion of the political and nationality ones [7]. Obviously, under our conditions, this is not the case. Yes, many of them are young, but very many are also elderly trying at the end of their lives to realize their experience in life and intellectual potential. There are many fewer women and persons employed in the service sector although on the other hand there are significantly more scientists, writers, journalists and

persons in the free professions. Our ecologists are usually moderately well off persons but also among them there are many who are simply poor (students, pensioners and workers in the nature conservation services). Yes, high professionalism is essential here, but the political situation in the nation has made many ecoactivists the political leaders of a nationality or even statewide scale.

It is logical to assume that the bearers of the new values should be persons who possess high human qualities. An analysis of the make-up of the Soviet ecological vanguard confirms this hypothesis. These, as a rule, are intelligent persons in the specific sense of this word, that is, broadly educated, humanistically oriented and with developed civil self-awareness. Here, if this is education it is a real one and not according to any diploma, it is real professionalism and not according to rank and title and the concern for the problems of man and the environment is authentic and not symbolic. "Professional + citizen + activist" is the formula for the vanguard of the ecomovement.

The "periphery" of the ecological movement (and here this word must be taken in quotes because the relations existing between it and the core are completely different than in the administrative system and are based on cooperation and mutual support) is comprised of the most diverse groups of civil initiatives either independent or members of mass ecological movements and people's fronts. They usually bring together in their activity a special-problem (specific) approach and belonging to a certain environment, territory or landscape. These include the student nature conservation circles, the ecoclubs, the youth initiative funds, family-neighborhood associations, juvenile clubs, social initiative associations and many others. Let us emphasize that the ecologists defend the habitat as a whole (with good reason, some of them have incorporated in their names the word "noosphere") and they see the main way to achieving this goal in fundamental social changes carried out in the course of perestroika.

According to our estimates, the number of ecological groups is around 8 percent of the nation's urban population over the age of 14 while approximately 1 percent of this population is engaged in this work permanently [10]. Interestingly, the magnitude of the figures here is the same as in the United States, West Germany and other countries [3, 7]. This is not an accidental coincidence but rather proof of the global importance of ecological problems, on the one hand, and the reality of the democratization process in the USSR, on the other. The presence of mass ecological movements and "alternative" formations is a standard for any democratic society.

Who "inhabits" quadrants II and IV? Not only the success of the ecological movement, but also the fate of society as a whole depend upon the position of these people. At first glance it would seem that both quadrants should be empty due to the mutually exclusive nature of the orientations comprising them. However, the fact is

that the economic and social status, the culture and a number of other features of these groups give rise to very contradictory value orientations.

Let us designate the population in quadrant II as "workers" and quadrant IV as "inhabitants." Of course, there is not the contradiction between them as there is between the members of the administrative system and the ecological movements. Moreover, often these are simply the same persons and with a change of age or family status and so forth, they can move from one category to another. At the same time, there are numerous ties between them including family, neighbor, personal, there are similar cultural traits and so forth. All the same, typologically their value orientations and attitudes toward the habitat vary. Since the former are directly involved in a system of material production which evermore destroys the habitat, they, as a rule, are rationalists and technocrats. The latter are primarily involved in the milieu of social reproduction and for this reason they are more humanistically oriented. Correspondingly, the former see in their activity a means (earnings, public consumption funds) which provide access to vital goods, while the latter defend the independent value of the habitat and invest personal forces in its protection and reproduction. The former are employed primarily in the sphere of material production, primarily at large national enterprises, they are rural migrants, particularly in the first generation. The latter are children, young persons, young mothers, sick persons and pensioners, persons employed in the service sphere, education, culture, as well as modern (computer) sectors of social production.

As is shown by analysis of the operation of enterprises under the new conditions, the inner aspirations of the employees there are rather contradictory. Yes, they want independence and struggle for it with all their forces, that is, they support the key areas of the economic and political reforms. But at the same time, in any event for now, they do not express their doubts on the advisability of their production. Having gained independence, they will increase production while reducing outlays at the expense of waste-treatment facilities. Among those who join a demonstration, protesting against the lethal influence on the environment of, for instance, the existing biochemical plants, we virtually do not find their employees. The orientation to the system is as yet stronger than the orientation to the environment. These people continue to feel that the goods acquirable in the system (additional remuneration, better housing, improved services and increased pensions) compensate for the negative aspects of their harmful production.

Here it is important, in the first place, to have an objective coinciding of interests between the rank-and-file employees and their leaders. If increased independence at the enterprise leads to higher earnings, the attraction to it will grow stronger. Secondly, the existing legislation for now securely protects the leaders against any sanctions for worsening the state of the natural and social environment. Even the fines do not intimidate, as

they are compensated for by bonuses for the development of production, the output of additional product and so forth. Thirdly, broadening economic independence places increased material prosperity and social goods for the employees directly dependent upon the intensification of existing production. In other words, again there is encouragement for the prevailing of local interests over universal ones. And as a result, the desire of the enterprises to build housing just for "themselves" and certainly close to production, the repeated emergencies in the subsidiary systems which cause harm to adjacent rivers and fields, abandoning the construction of waste-treatment facilities, the reduction in their own systems monitoring the state of the environment, the concealing or distorting of facts of polluting, the overoperation of the municipal infrastructures and much else.

What distinguishes the "residents"? In our notion, this is a social concept which designates the linking of a person with the local environment and the dependence of his physical and social qualities upon its state. The more the residents invest in it, the more they inhabit it, the more valuable this environment becomes for them. Thus, it is a question of the bearers of a localist awareness, however, in contrast to the members of the administrative system and the "workers," they endeavor to protect and improve not the organization to which they belong but precisely the habitat. So, these are people who value the environment and who in one way or another are rooted in it. Since the environment continues to degrade, they, in joining various initiative groups and independent organizations, are involved in the struggle for preserving it. Such a struggle, even over the question of strictly local problems, is a great teacher and educator of civil awareness. The logic of this struggle forces them to seek out allies among the ecologists and sharply politicizes their awareness (even a year ago it would have been hard to imagine that the leader of a local environmental group could contest the secretary of the CPSU raykom for the right to be the deputy candidate to the USSR Supreme Soviet).

The difference between the "workers" and "residents" is particularly visible in their attitude toward science. The former are indifferent to it and this is a negative fact, since the danger of technological innovations leading to the intensification of production and the hardening of standards derives from science. The latter are interested in contact with scientists and other specialists, since independent expertise and consultations are among the few means for effectively resisting projects which destroy the habitat. Among the "residents" are many professionals who act as leaders of the initiative groups and protest actions.

The views of these groups also differ over the social sphere. The command methods of economic leadership not only involved enormous masses of workers from material production in the process of destroying the habitat, but also accustomed many to the notion that this was the inevitable payment for the goods of civilization.

On the contrary, the "residents" create their own organizations and the work in these not only leads to a sharp improvement in the habitat but also satisfies inherent human needs for intercourse, mutual understanding, creative labor and so forth.

Finally, the political behavior of the designated groups also differs. No matter how naive and inconsistent the initiative groups are in their actions, they were involved in a real democratic process. Let us emphasize that these groups and associations arose before the beginning of perestroika and for this reason they already have their own traditions, tactics and political experience. Many "workers" at present, in the 5th year of perestroika, live under conditions of very limited production democracy as the administrative system still has too many opportunities for suppressing their activity and profaning it.

### Dynamics and Prospects

If, in elucidating the reasons for the formation of the movement, we have focused attention on the value and sociopsychological factors, for understanding its dynamics, it is essential to draw attention to other features of the movement.

Let us begin with the fact that the existing political situation has favored the development of the ecomovement. The broadening glasnost has finally revealed, although far from completely, the banned statistics concerning the birth and death rates, particularly infantile, the level of air pollution and has made other information accessible without which the movement simply could not have existed. The ban has been lifted on discussing nuclear power and this also has been a major victory for the activists of the ecomovement. Ever-new initiative groups and associations arise literally daily and their programs include ecoprotective actions. Ecological demands have long held one of the first places in the election programs and the leaders of the ecomovements have become USSR people's deputies. Finally, the new thinking and the broadening of international contacts have not only made it possible to exchange experience and information with the "Green" Movement abroad, but, let me emphasize this particularly, have given our ecoactivists an entire "packet" of models in the form of international general democratic and conservation law.

The economic situation is leading—directly or indirectly—to the aggravating of ecological problems. Directly because the inertia of this system is extremely great and, consequently, the probability of an increased deficit, the implementing of ecologically dangerous projects like pollution and new ecological disasters will rise. Cost accounting and the independence of enterprises in their existing form will further strengthen the antienvironment orientation of the workers and block the already meager conservation measures.

The sociopsychological prerequisites for the development of the ecomovement are extremely heterogeneous. The previous election campaign provided the movement with a powerful positive impetus, the criticism and

dissatisfaction of the masses with the activities of a number of departments like the former Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management has been growing, but in society there is no integrated concept of ecologization. It is important that the brunt of general social criticism be directed against the existing system of the distribution of goods (wage leveling and the elimination of group privileges), but not against the existing system of values and priority. In society there still is no comprehension that the existing economy cannot become "more economic" or resource-saving. It is impossible to abandon the gross and the plan without revising the value bases of our life.

Recent public opinion polls show a general rise in alarm; a fear of major technical emergencies and disasters was pointed out by 85 percent of those questioned, natural disasters by 76.2 percent and an ecological crisis by 50 percent [11]. But the attitude toward them is strictly traditional ("Chernobyl was a misfortune, an accident," "the best means against radiation is vodka" and so forth), and they lack the elementary skills of first aid in disasters. The main thing is that there is no awareness that the dangers themselves have fundamentally changed and that they often now have neither color nor aroma, they are invisible and can reach a person in any place. Even in Estonia, where 31 percent of those questioned are bearers of developed ecological awareness, only 4 percent was ready for immediate action [12]. Finally, it is completely unclear what role in assimilating the new system of values related to the transition to an ecologically oriented way of life will be played by the generations-long habit for a significant portion of society to live under conditions of a shortage and simple poverty.

In conclusion, let us try to evaluate the development prospects of the ecological movement in two versions: pessimistic and optimistic. The former version is possible if one or several ecological disasters occur. In this instance, the introduction of a state of emergency, sanctions, an outburst of secrecy, and increased international tension will undoubtedly sharply reduce the independent activities of the population. But let us hope for the optimistic version which is based on a further development of economic and political reform. In this instance, it seems to us, over the next 2 or 3 years we can expect a further development of the ecomovement and its subsequent stabilization. In 10-12 years, it is possible to have the next step up, but now on a new social basis and under new socioeconomic conditions (scientific and technical progress, the introduction of ecotechnology, universal ecological literacy and so forth). The intellectual and informational resources of the movement will grow, primarily due to the professionalization of its core and the establishing of its own information and publishing facilities. The organizational resources of the movements, with the exception of the Baltic, are as yet insignificant. There is no national center which coordinates the actions on the spot and there is no developed organizational and technical infrastructure. For this reason, the fate of many important actions depends upon the goodwill of the rich social organizations,

newspapers or personal ties. Finally, the political weight of the movement will grow undoubtedly and this is directly linked to those particular features of ecological values mentioned above. A number of the national movements is seriously discussing the possibility of establishing a party of Greens in the republics. However, even without them the arrival of the main leaders in the superior legislative body means a sharp strengthening of the entire movement's positions. Even now virtually all the elements of the ecological paradigm have been set out in the programs of republic cost accounting. And this has been done not generally or as a whole, but rather in the form of specific tasks and instruments for their realization. Thus, the most difficult, protracted but vitally essential stage in reorienting the economy and all social life to the goals of human development and the conservation of nature has already commenced.

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## DISCUSSIONS

**Alienation Under Socialism (Roundtable  
Discussion of the Editorial Staff) [not translated]**

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**Stalinism in the Context of Historical Progress  
[not translated]**

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**TOWARD THE 12TH WORLD  
SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS****Sociostructural Communities as Principals of Vital  
Activity [not translated]**

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**On the Path to New Thinking**

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pp 63-69

[Article by Vilen Nikolayevich Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences and department head at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] An analysis of the process of the shaping of new political thinking which should institute common human standards and values in the relations between peoples and states, exclude violence in any of its forms and unite the various social forces in the struggle for humanistic progress and the survival of mankind is among the most important research tasks proposed by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Raising the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in Solving the Key Social Problems of Soviet Society."

The process of instituting the new thinking can be studied under the condition of viewing its content and forms in the closest linkage with perestroika as a whole. In essence, these are facets of a single approach to modern realities. Solving the internal problems of socialist renewal for our society should work to strengthen peace and good-neighbor relations between countries and for the sake of preserving and progress in human civilization. As was pointed out by M.S. Gorbachev in a report at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "Perestroika in the Soviet Union cannot help but reflect on all our international activities but it also cannot be carried out in maintaining the former foreign policy" [1].

The problem of forming new thinking is one of the most important research subjects for the academy-wide program "Man—Science—Society." The appropriate questions hold a central place in the draft of the IS AN SSSR [Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] "Social and Ideological Problems in Establishing the New Thinking."

At present, intensive debates are underway in the nation concerning socialism. Its current model which is the result of the activities of the command-administrative system of rule has led to profound deformations in our society. These deformations should be overcome in the course of perestroika in order to ensure the transition to a new model of socialism the basic contours of which were outlined at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Without anticipating the future in detail, it can be said with confidence that the new model of socialism will be characterized by a real humanism, an effective and dynamic economy, socialist social justice, authentic democracy, equality of all nations and nationalities as well as high culture and morality [2]. Such socialism can possess a great potential effect on world processes, including on the establishing of peace and civilized relations between all peoples and states.

However, the realization of the ideas of new political thinking requires significant effort and a consistent struggle against the forces which have not abandoned the dogmas of military power thinking and the principles hostile to peaceful coexistence and social progress and which wager on the arms race and military superiority over other countries. Thus, in a document prepared by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, the conclusion is drawn that even in the future there is no necessity for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. The authors of the paper call merely for the ascertaining of an "optimum balance" between nuclear and conventional weapons (see [3]). This is a clear manifestation of the selfish interests of a certain portion of the monopolistic upper clique and which has gained the corresponding grounds in various sorts of concepts such as the theory of nuclear deterrents, flexible response, containment, and recently the so-called "competing strategies" designed for the long run to the 21st Century. These are based upon plans for waging a certain type of non-nuclear warfare employing modern equipment (see [4]).

Of course, this conservative current in bourgeois social science does not determine its entire appearance. In it there is also another line which reflects humanistic views and concepts. Precisely the latter creates the necessary prerequisites for greater mutual understanding and collaboration in the struggle for peace and human rights. We have merely to recall the remarkable manifesto of B. Russell and A. Einstein who urged mankind to eliminate international conflicts from political practice as fraught

with fatal consequences or the works of K. Jaspers, in particular, the book which gained world renown "The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Mankind," and in which he pointed out that "the old policy was based on the principle of a state of hostility and the promise of war. The new policy is based on the principle of the possibility of honest, reasonable coexistence and the promise of peace" [5].

Of more than historical interest are certain ideas of the movement "Critical Research on the Problems of Peace" which became widespread in the West in the mid-1960s and within which there arose international and national institutes studying the problems of peace. In particular, the declaration of this movement "On the Present State of the Critical State of Peace" stated the need for social changes in a spirit of social justice and real democracy as prerequisites for an international world order. They stated directly that "the critical researchers of peace reject the study of peace oriented at the status quo and they are endeavoring to prevent political apathy and understand what is concealed behind the ideologically camouflaged conflicts" [6].

The works of the representatives of this school contain appeals to work out a "pedagogics of peace" in the aim of using the means of training and education to establish universal peace. Their rebirth and support can be a very beneficial thing on the level of a well reasoned justification for the necessity of new thinking and the propagandizing of its provisions primarily for the public of the Western countries.

We must also not overlook the works of the Club of Rome which contain appeals to "recognize the world problems" and understand the sources and consequences of the "crisis in human civilization." Thus, in the book by the now deceased president of this club, A. Peccei, "The Human Quality" the current state of the world was defined as "a special, all-encompassing epochal crisis which permeates all aspects of human life." In order not to allow a fatal end he urged for looking "beyond the interests of today's generations" and called for the "joint, collective, coordinated actions of different states and organizations" [7].

These theoretical approaches and positions with their correct interpretation can be employed for understanding common human threats and problems where a solution to them presupposes a comprehensive approach and the pooling of efforts under conditions where the world is divided by contradictions of a national, class and regional nature. Their analysis helps determine the social forces capable of waging a struggle for the survival of mankind, for humanization and the demilitarization of international relations, for developing new forms of the movement for peace, ecological security and nuclear disarmament.

Certainly, the problem situation is characterized not only by this. The establishing of new thinking in the mind of our nation's population is also not devoid of

contradictions. The path of new thinking is blocked by the "black and white" vision of the world which developed over many years, by the notion of an inevitable confrontation with the West, mistrust in its policies and intentions and stereotypes of the enemy. To this we must add the absence in our population of experience in direct contact with the inhabitants of other countries and the essential knowledge about the countries themselves, their past and present, their history and culture.

A poll conducted in the first half of 1989 of different categories of the employed population in Kuybyshev and Moscow showed an insufficient understanding on the part of certain population groups of a number of fundamental ideas and principles in the new political thinking.<sup>1</sup> For example, some 45 percent of the workers, 35 percent of the students and 18 percent of the television editors pointed directly to a difficulty in comprehending such a concept as "deideologization of international relations." The term "conversion of military production" was not understood by 31 percent of the representatives of the humanities intelligentsia, 26 percent of the students, 32 percent of the school pupils and so forth. In the process of the poll, a discrepancy was also discovered with certain concepts of the new thinking. The existing situation places increased demands on the activities of the mass information and propaganda media. A special word must be said about the activities of TASS and the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio] which currently have a monopoly right to foreign policy information. Their responsibility to the Soviet people is increasing particularly, including in solving the problems of establishing the new thinking. Some 39 percent of the questioned representatives of the humanities intelligentsia, 36 percent of the workers and 40 percent of the ideological aktiv noted their dissatisfaction with the materials of Central Television on international questions, and similar data were obtained on assessments of radio and newspaper activities. The miscomprehension or rejection of various provisions of the new political thinking can arouse active or passive resistance to it in certain groups of the public.

What are the main areas for studying the process of the shaping of the new thinking? As an object of research it would be advisable to ascertain the mass and group awareness of our nation's public, as well as its response to the new thinking. The subject of the research would be the trends in the change of mass and group awareness under the impact of the process of establishing the main components of the new thinking and the practical implementation of the Soviet foreign policy and defense initiatives. The corresponding scientific problem presupposes the necessity of the further elaboration of the concept of the new thinking and the ways of its establishment in the public mind in our nation and abroad on the basis of studying the interests, motives, incentives, estimates and values of various social communities, and disclosing the contradictions between the understanding of common human and class values on the theoretical

level and on the level of ordinary awareness. Certainly, the problem also has a serious practical aspect related to the necessity of actually involving the Soviet people in the process of taking foreign policy decisions, the need to work out recommendations for improving various forms of international mass communication, the restructuring of ideological work in this direction and creating an effectively operating mechanism for studying and considering public opinion on the most important aspects of international relations.

It is essential to emphasize that for a long time the elaboration and implementation of foreign policy was a concern for a narrow group of professional politicians while the basic mass of the public was assigned the role of extras who constantly approved everything conceived of above (the role of social scientists in essence was reduced to the same thing, namely commentary and propaganda of decision taken without their involvement).

A fundamental change in the status of the working masses in international affairs and the converting of them into a principal of the new, humanistic and essentially democratic thinking can be achieved only by creating the necessary conditions. This, in particular, would be aided by a constant broad and free discussion in the newly elected USSR Supreme Soviet and in the mass information media.

In our opinion, the main tasks in studying the problem consist in the following:<sup>2</sup> studying the dynamics of establishing the new thinking in various social media; determining the optimum forms of worker involvement in resolving foreign policy questions; studying the system of values making up the structure of the new thinking and their reflection in mass and group awareness; disclosing the relationship of common human, class and national values; disclosing the particular features of the shaping of humanitarian values and an understanding of humanitarian problems under the conditions of perestroika; studying the estimates, judgments and actions relating to the sphere of international relations; studying the particular features of shaping the attitude toward other nations and peoples (the "we-them" relations); investigating the conditions which shape social stereotypes in the perceptions of states and peoples; forecasting the dynamics of the main elements of new thinking over the close and medium-term future; studying the information factors in shaping the new thinking, including: an analysis of the impact of glasnost on the level of information concerning the problems of new thinking; investigating the relationship of the level of information and the level of trust between the public of different countries; disclosing the forms and content of contact between people in the process of understanding and assimilating the ideas of new thinking; disclosing the scale of distribution of conservative-dogmatic views on international problems.

Let us endeavor to point out certain prospects for the shaping and establishing of the new thinking. Over the

next few years, under the impact of Soviet foreign policy and, in particular, the confidence-building measures, the fear of the USSR as a source of threat will cease to be a dominant theme in the Western mind. Anti-Sovietism will weaken. However, this will not involve the positions of such anti-Soviet and antisocialist organizations as the People's Labor Union, the Resistance International and others which view socialism as an "historical anomaly." This process will certainly not develop rectilinearly. Not only our peace-loving initiatives but also well-reasoned propaganda of the solving of humanitarian problems in our nation can play a special role in a positive impact on the public of the Western nations. The difficulties and setbacks of perestroika (particularly in terms of democratization and glasnost) are capable of strengthening a skeptical attitude on the part of certain circles in the West toward the new thinking.

The main obstacle on the path to the establishing of new thinking in the capitalist countries is the policy and ideology of the monopolistic circles linked to military-industrial production as well as the image of the USSR preserved and actively supported by the reactionary forces as an enemy and the myths of the Soviet military threat, military superiority, the age-old aggressiveness of Russia and "communist expansionism."

The social support for reactionary views and concepts is a certain portion of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and workers linked to the defense business or those under the influence of anticommunist and militaristic propaganda.

The emigres from the Soviet Union comprise a special group in the population of the Western nations. Positive shifts are occurring in their attitudes and view of the former motherland. The strengthening of contacts with it and an effective ideological impact (the explanation of Soviet foreign policy and the changes occurring within the nation) can make them active supporters and proponents of the ideas of new thinking. At the same time, a portion of the emigres remains fixed on anti-Soviet positions of indiscriminate running down and denying of perestroika.

There will be growing political activeness of a certain portion of the bourgeoisie in the Western countries (and its ideologists) which have set for themselves the goal of using the new situation in the world related to the abandoning of the dogmas of the Cold War, for changing socialism, for its "improvement" and merging with a "modernized" capitalism. A significant part of the Western public views perestroika in our nation as a return to the values of bourgeois democracy. For many, the differences between socialist and bourgeois democracy remain unclear.

In our nation the establishing of new thinking is impeded by the notions which have developed over the decades of the capitalist states as a constant source of military tension and conflicts, as an untrustworthy partner where the influencing of this partner requires powerful military potential and the absolutizing of the confrontational

model of interaction between the two social systems and class tasks to the detriment of human ones.

A definite negative role in the establishing of new thinking in our nation and the other socialist countries can be played by the mass penetration of the Western information sources into the information space of these nations, by their propagandizing of the status quo in social development and by the discrediting of socialism and perestroika.

The inadequate assessment of socialism and changes in the system of values shared by different population groups have a substantial impact on the perception of the new thinking and the attitude toward specific actions. In particular, the values are influenced by the deteriorating material conditions in the life of the people, by the increased prices, the scarcity of goods and services and the exacerbation of international relations. Here a negative role can also be played by the incorrect views of socialism as a social system and of its potential capabilities, by unconstructive criticism, by theoretical "shying away," by a nondialectical negation of the past and shortcomings in our propaganda.

Activating international contact and the exchange of spiritual values lead to increased intensity in the ideological clash in new forms which exclude "psychological warfare," fanaticism and intolerance and making a cult of the "image of the enemy." However, possible differences of opinion with the West in achieving various agreements (particularly in the military area) can give rise to (or intensify) mistrust on the part of a certain portion of the Soviet people in the potential of the new thinking and its prospects.

The greatest difficulty in assimilating and accepting the new thinking is found in the miscomprehension of the dialectics of the class and general human, particularly in terms of the revolutionary renewal of society. The greatest resistance to the spread of the new thinking can be put up by elderly persons who are under the sway of dogmatism, who are incapable (or who do not wish) to revise their former confrontational thinking inculcated over the years and decades. As a whole, the positions of social conservatism in the thinking of the various age groups of the public (particularly the elderly and middle-aged) are very strong and the overcoming of this will be complex and relatively extended. The young scientific and technical intelligentsia is the portion of the populus most susceptible to the new thinking.

Along with the ideological factors there are also psychological ones which impede the assimilation and adoption of the basic provisions and principles of the new thinking and its implementation in practice. In particular, in the preserving of the past stereotypes an important role is played by their "emotional support" and the related attitudes and experiences of the people. The latter in turn depend largely upon the overall ideological and sociopsychological situation in the nation and upon the

intensity of politicizing the consciousness of the different population groups. Abrupt shifts influence the emotional coloring of permanent notions and views, accelerating, on the one hand, the destruction of obsolete stereotypes and, on the other, evoking sharply negative emotions in those who cannot or do not wish to reassess their values and abandon the obsolete and out of date.

The establishing of the new thinking in the mass conscience depends directly upon a restructuring in the activities of the mass information and propaganda media, upon the effectiveness, completeness and persuasiveness of the information offered by them and upon their competitiveness under the conditions of a full freedom of broadcasting (and in the future television) in light of the demands of the Helsinki Agreements and the proposals of the London Information Forum (1989). More complete information on the response in the West to democratization and glasnost in our nation undoubtedly will play a positive role in disseminating the ideas of the new thinking.

One of the main problem of research is the elaboration of a system of indicators for the establishing of the new thinking. As such, it is possible to use indicators characterizing the goals of the new thinking, the means of their realization, potential opportunities and both the verbal and the real attitude of the various population groups to the new thinking. A relatively independent group is made up of indicators characterizing the fundamental values of a socialist society and objectively included in the ideological clash of the two systems. This clash is acquiring more and more the nature of the opposition of images of persons under different social conditions (and not only the clash of ideas, views and concepts).

The deideologization of international relations does not mean the abandonment of the existing system of values by any side. The current turning point in world history presupposes an intensification of spiritual exchange, an active, competitive comparison which excludes confrontation for what has been achieved and planned as well as the search for points of contact, areas of convergence and understanding.

#### Footnotes

1. Some 1,200 persons were questioned representing different categories of the employed population: workers, engineers, technicians and representatives of the humanities intelligentsia. As control groups, we questioned the editors of republic and oblast television and radio broadcasting which were being trained at the All-Union Institute for Advanced Training of Radio and Television Workers Under the USSR Gosteleradio.

2. A special group of research tasks is comprised of a range of social problems and contradictions arising over the unilateral reduction of the USSR Armed Forces and the conversion of military production. The increased scale of the latter has the principles of the new thinking are implemented increases the importance of the prompt and scientifically sound economic and social planning.

This should encompass such questions as the release of employees at defense enterprises, their vocational retraining, job placement, providing of housing, organizing the use of military equipment in the national economy and so forth. Sociologists should be involved in this work on equal footing with economists, military specialists, lawyers and representatives from the other sciences.

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### Dynamics of Leisure Contact [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 89  
pp 69-73

## EMPLOYMENT, PERSONNEL TURNOVER, ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

### Is There a Labor Surplus in Central Asia?

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 89  
pp 74-79

[Article by Galina Fedorovna Morozova, candidate of economic sciences, senior science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. She is the author of the monograph "Regionalnyye osobennosti migratsionnykh protsessov v SSSR" [Regional Features of Migration Processes in the USSR] (1986, co-author). Our journal has published her article "Experience of Sociological Research on Population Migration in the Far East" (No 2, 1976, co-author)]

[Text] There is the widespread opinion that the Central Asian Region has a labor surplus. This opinion has become accepted, although it is far from indisputable. It

is based upon data concerning the high birthrate in the region and the supposedly too rapid growth of the working age population which has outstripped the availability of jobs.

At first glance, such a viewpoint is confirmed by the statistics. For example, in Tajikistan, in 1981-1986, the labor resources rose by 16.9 percent, while the number of persons employed in social production or involved in studies increased only by 13.7 percent; the number of persons not employed in social production over this same period also rose and by 1986 had reached 234,000 persons [1, pp 63-64]. A similar trend was also found in the other Central Asian Republics, and this has been mentioned at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In particular, it was pointed out that in Uzbekistan the number of unemployed in the nationalized economy reached 760,000 persons [2]. As a whole for the territory of the Central Asian Republics, there were around 2 million persons unemployed in nationalized production in 1988, or 13 percent of the working-age population.

The presence of this contingent has also created the opinion of the labor surplus in Central Asia. It seems to us that to a large degree it is based upon an incorrect identification of the concepts of "employment" and "employment in the state sector of the national economy."

For example, in Fergana Oblast, where the population is over 1 million, some 263,000 of the working-age population is not employed in nationalized production, including 12,000 unemployed (or 4.6 percent of the total number of unemployed in nationalized production) [3]. How many unemployed are there in the oblast?

At the same time, in relying on the obsolete concept of employment in the nationalized (state) sector of the economy, it is assumed that in the 13th Five-Year Plan, this contingent—unemployed in nationalized production—will increase. For example, just in Tajikistan, according to the forecast estimates, some 130,000 persons will additionally be involved in nationalized production, that is, around 1/2 of the entire unemployed working-age population [1, p 65].

It has repeatedly been proposed that until the end of the century Central Asia will maintain a high increase in the working-age population and limited opportunities for putting it to work in the sphere of nationalized production due to the low increase in the number of jobs.

It is impossible to agree with this as the researchers like it or not have proceeded from the assumption that the nation's economy in the future will develop along extensive lines with an excessive centralization of national economic management.

The extended development of the national economy on an extensive basis has occurred with an underestimation of the quality of the labor force. In other words, the latter has been viewed as a passive component in the production process. Such an approach has presupposed the

filling out of labor resources through a territorial or intersectoral redistribution by directive instructions. Here no consideration has been given to the educational level of the people, their vocational and skill training, demographic characteristics, nationality and ethnocultural features or the ability to adapt to new natural, social and production conditions.

The underestimating of these factors has caused the departure of worker personnel and the maintaining of a labor resource deficit, an increase in the unemployed population and an exacerbation of the problem of job placement. In both instances, the "resource" approach has led to disproportions between the amount of the labor resources and the number of jobs and this has given rise to the above-named problems.

The dividing of the nation's regions into labor-short (the North, Siberia and Far East) and labor-surplus (the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus) is largely an outgrowth of the administrative methods of economic management which gained predominance in the 1920s and 1930s. At precisely that time, the interests of society were replaced by the interests of the sectors and departments. This was expressed in the playing down of the rights of the republics and imposing on them directions and rates of development in the economy which derived from the plans and strategies of the sectors and the departments and not from the production potential and national features existing in the republics [4]. Such a policy led to the irrational utilization of labor forces and to the increased demand of the regions for additional manpower.

The problem of employment of the population in Central Asia must also be viewed from this angle. There must be adjustments in the assessment of the labor surplus as at the present stage they have still not exhausted the opportunities for using the natural

resources and production potential of the Central Asian Republics for increasing the employment of the working-age population.

There are several ways for resolving the problem of employment for the population: developing new lands; an intra- and intersectoral reallocation of labor resources in favor of the labor-intensive industrial sectors; the broad involvement of the unemployed rural population into labor-intensive jobs based on local raw materials and the development of folk and artistic crafts.

The construction of the designated facilities in rural localities in and of itself will require the attraction of additional workers. This also brings about the development of a production infrastructure in the countryside and this, in turn, substantially broadens the opportunity to employ the labor of the unemployed rural population. A significant portion of the rural inhabitants, in being involved in social production, continues to live under customary conditions.

The demand for a labor force also arises in moving enterprises into the small- and medium-sized towns, urban-type settlements and the centers of rural regions. And this can be satisfied from local labor resources. Thus, even now in these population points, some 98 percent of the personnel at the industrial enterprises is recruited from the local residents [5, p 122].

The socioeconomic development of the region has caused an increased demand for manpower and at a more rapid pace in the nonproduction sectors, as here there are fewer possibilities for replacing humans with machines. At the same time, the development of the social sphere in the Central Asian Republics has lagged greatly behind the other regions of the USSR.

Let us examine certain important indicators for the standard of living in the Central Asian Republics in comparison with republics where these indicators are the best (Table 1).

**Table 1: Individual Indicators for Standard of Living in Certain Republics of the Nation in 1987 [6]**

Republics	Retail Trade Turnover	Average Monthly Wage	Available Housing Area	Number of Physicians
USSR	1206	202.9	15.2	43.3
RSFSR	1322	216.1	15.1	46.3
Belorussia	1337	190.0	16.7	39.1
Lithuania	1480	204.1	18.1	44.3
Latvia	1722	208.9	18.9	49.3
Estonia	1853	229.0	20.8	47.9
Uzbekistan	720	169.7	11.3	34.7
Kirghizia	811	171.4	11.4	35.1
Tajikistan	648	165.9	8.9	27.2
Turkmenia	825	198.4	10.3	34.7

Note: The following indicators have been used—1) per capita retail commodity turnover in state and cooperative trade, (rubles); 2) average monthly wages of manual and white collar workers (rubles); 3) average housing area available per inhabitant ( $m^2$ ); 4) number of doctors per thousand inhabitants.

The given values for the standard of living indicators show the need to develop the social sphere in the Central Asian Republics. The latter can absorb a larger portion of the increase in the working-age population both in the rural and urban settlements. For example, in Tajikistan, the development of the social infrastructure up to the average Union level will make it possible to increase employment by 350,000-400,000 persons [7]. The social sphere is marked by a certain flexibility in the sense of the differentiated involvement of labor (an incomplete workday, incomplete work week, labor at home and so forth). These types of employment to the greatest degree correspond to the demographic specific features of the region.

There is one other important aspect which must be clarified. There must also be adjustments in the notion of the high birthrate in Central Asia in the foreseeable future [7]. Often this opinion is based on the use of the rough birthrate indicators (general coefficients) which actually in Central Asia are stable or even growing. However, this stability and growth are deceptive and are explained by changes in the marital and age structure of the population exclusively. If we employ more adequate indicators and particularly the total birthrate coefficients, then it turns out that the birthrate level in women of the Central Asian indigenous nationalities is dropping rather quickly (Table 2).

**Table 2: Total Coefficients for Birthrate Among Women of Indigenous Nationalities for Certain Union Republics, per 1,000 Women [9]**

Republics	Urban Population			Rural Population		
	1969-1970	1978-1979	1978-1979 to 1969-1970	1969-1970	1978-1979	1978-1979 to 1969-1970
RSFSR	1680	1669	0.989	2210	2293	1.038
Belorussia	2082	1879	0.902	2672	2520	0.943
Uzbekistan	5775	4292	0.743	7917	7090	0.896
Kirghizia	5881	4298	0.731	8129	7352	0.904
Tajikistan	7224	4835	0.669	7591	6030	0.794
Turkmenia	6944	5581	0.804	8029	7078	0.881

The data of Table 2 show that among the Tajik women living in cities over the 9 years (between 1969-1970 and 1978-1979), the total birthrate coefficient declined from 7.224 to 4.835, or by 33.1 percent, and for those living in rural areas by 20.6 percent.

In the 1980s, the process of a drop in the birthrate in the Central Asian Republics has continued. Thus, as a whole over the period from 1978-1979 through 1986-1987, the total birthrate coefficient has declined by 9.9 percent in Turkmenia, by 9.0 percent in Uzbekistan, by 6.4 percent in Kirghizia and 4.9 percent in Tajikistan (calculated from [9, p 22]).

There is every reason to assume that this process will accelerate in the near future (the Central Asian Republics are entering the next phase of demographic transition, as has already occurred in Armenia and Azerbaijan). Thus, the influence of the demographic factor on the labor surplus in this region will begin to lessen in the not distant future.

It is also essential to change the notion of optimum female employment in the country in nationalized production generally and in Central Asia in particular. It is time to realize that the household is a part of the social economy and employment in it is employment in social production. In Central Asia, around 40 percent of the women not employed in social production are mothers with large families. It is scarcely possible to consider them "nonparticipating labor resources."

It is essential to consider that the educational and skill level of a significant portion of the women employed in the household is low. For example, in Tajikistan these are 64 percent [10]. For this reason, the opportunity for using them as a labor force is very limited, all the more as in a number of national economic sectors they now basically require highly skilled workers.

In addition, it is essential to consider employment in the household and private subsidiary farms. The population employed in the household and the private subsidiary farm must not be viewed uniformly as labor surplus, as it makes a major contribution to supplying the republic inhabitants with food products. In Tajikistan, precisely this sphere of activity produces around 1/4 of the gross agricultural product and up to 40 percent of the food. In 1986, the proportional amount of the product produced on the private subsidiary farms of this republic were: 55 percent in fruit production, 42 percent for vegetables, 40 percent for meat and 49 percent for milk [11]. The private subsidiary farms occupy 1 percent of the republic agricultural land and approximately 6 percent of the irrigated area. In Tashkent Oblast, where just 2.5 percent of the plowed lands is employed on the private subsidiary farms, these produce 27 percent of the potatoes, vegetables and melon crops, 35 percent of the meat and 55 percent of the milk [12]. These examples are proof of the high productiveness of the private subsidiary farms and the labor of the workers employed in this sphere must be qualified as socially useful and necessary.

Recognition of this fact has been reflected in the radical economic reform which provides for the extensive development of the cooperative movement, individual labor activity, the family contract, leasing and so forth. We feel that the new approach in the view of the various types of employment for the population will lead to a reassessment of the problem of the labor surplus in the Central Asian Region.

A characteristic trait of the rural population in the Central Asian Republics is the low migration activity (the intensity of migration by the rural population which basically consists of representatives of the indigenous nationalities is 4-5-fold less than the urban dwellers of this region). This feature partially explains the fact that in Central Asian rural localities is to be found over  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the working-age population not employed in social production. A significant portion of this contingent is employed in the household and on the private subsidiary farm. In the 1980s, there was an increased number of persons employed in this sphere of activity.

In the scientific literature and periodical press this phenomenon is given basically a negative judgment, since all persons employed in the household and the private subsidiary farm are viewed as potential labor resources. Since the industrial enterprises of the cities experience an acute manpower need, the settling of the working-age population in this sphere is viewed as one of the factors holding back the economic development of the region.

In migration policy aimed at a rational redistribution of the population and labor resources, an important place is assigned to interregional migration. There is the opinion that it is essential to help strengthen the redistribution of the indigenous, basically rural population outside the region. A number of variations has been proposed among which, in the opinion of D.I. Zyuzin, the most acceptable is the resettlement of approximately 40 percent of the annual increase in the labor resources of Central Asia into the labor-short regions of the Russian Federation [13]. Such an approach to solving the problem of employment for the population is debatable. The importance and utility of interregional migration as a result of which there are qualitative changes in the educational, vocational and cultural-technical level of the population and labor resources are indisputable. However, the proposed variation for moving the population between regions does not sufficiently consider the interests of people. A "resource" approach to man at the present stage of economic development is unacceptable. Also overlooked is the structure of the unemployed population in the Central Asian Republics which, as was pointed out above, is made up basically of women. Hence, the proposed scale of migration and its effectiveness are debatable.

There are also other arguments against activating interregional migration. The examined variation does not provide a demand for labor resources which is linked to

the long-range development of the economy in the Central Asian Region itself. Moreover, the possibility of effectively drawing a labor force from Central Asia into the other regions of the nation is limited, as the introduction of new management methods leads to a release and redistribution of their own labor resources. Broadening the scale of construction for industrial enterprises in the labor-intensive sectors in rural localities as well as in the small- and medium-sized towns of the Central Asian Republics and the development of a production and social infrastructure in them will increase the demand for a labor force and this can come from attracting migrants, primarily floating workers [lit. pendulum]. Simultaneously, the scale interregional migration will change. Migration into other regions is also a tactic of yesterday and now it is essential to work out long-range strategic plans, where the migratory processes would be correlated to the development prospects of the entire national economy. At the present stage, priority belongs to floating migration as it not only provides the balanced and rational utilization of the labor resources in the city and countryside but also contributes to the development of social mobility in the population and to a change in the social structure of rural inhabitants. For the Central Asian Population, this process is particularly important since only the development of social and economic mobility can lead to an intensification of its territorial mobility by a natural means.

Let us sum up:

- 1) The notion of the labor surplus in Central Asia requires a revision on the basis of a careful analysis of the balance calculations of labor resources;
- 2) It is essential to change the attitude toward the private subsidiary farm and persons employed in this sphere must be considered employed in socially useful labor;
- 3) The migration policy in the Central Asian Region must be carried out on a differentiated basis and the potential migrants here are primarily the young people endeavoring to improve their educational and vocational level as well as persons having a high educational level but tied down in the household and the private subsidiary farm (with the exception of women with large families);
- 4) The development of floating migration, in contributing to the social mobility of the population in the Central Asian Republics, leads to accelerated development of its territorial mobility.

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### Seasonal Migration of Construction Workers

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[Article by Marina Andrianovna Shabanova, candidate of economic sciences, science associate at the Institute for the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production Under the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] Each year, millions of persons seek out seasonal work. These persons are termed differently and include moonlighters, leavers, seasonal workers, wild brigades and free hired brigades. The attitude toward them also varies.

After the promulgation of the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 15 May 1986 "On Systematizing

the Organization of Labor and Wages of Temporary Construction Brigades" and which, in particular, pointed out that "such brigades with the correct organizing of their activities make a definite contribution to economic, housing and cultural-service construction [1], the appeals to stop the "leavers" have died down. However, the seasonal role and the consequences of seasonal labor movements still wait to be analyzed.

In actuality, why year after year do people leave their families and friends for 5 or even 7 months? What is the social make-up of these people? How do these trips tell on their socioprofessional advancement, on the choice of vocation and the realization of other vital plans? Seasonal earnings are linked to the necessity of satisfying what requirements? Our research<sup>1</sup> does not provide an exhaustive answer to the listed questions. We will examine only certain aspects of unorganized seasonal migration.

The chief motive for traveling for seasonal work (95.6 percent of the respondents) was the desire to earn properly. This shows that in the places of permanent residence of the seasonal construction workers there was no opportunity for additional earnings. In actuality, in the Western Ukraine, in the Transcaucasus Republics and in the autonomous republics of the Northern Caucasus, natives of which comprise the basic portion (77 percent) of the respondents, there is a labor resource reserve, particularly in rural localities and the small- and medium-sized towns. An absolute majority of the respondents lives here: 67 percent in rural rayons and 23 percent in small towns. For this reason, it is no accident that almost 2/5 of the seasonal construction workers from the southern republics noted difficulties in finding employment at their place of residence, particularly in their specialty. In these regions the labor load factor per average annual worker in agriculture is substantially behind the average Union level. As a consequence of this there are comparatively low wages particularly in regions with a high birthrate. Seasonal labor migration makes it possible to substantially increase earnings and according to our data, the proportional amount of construction workers satisfied with the level of their income rises from 4 to 65 percent.

Another group of motives is linked to a desire to more fully realize oneself, to the desire of seeing new places, choosing a new place of residence, or working with relatives (a father, brothers or husband). Some young construction workers arrive from the Transcaucasus to a Siberian village in order to be admitted to the Siberian higher institutions of learning.

The specific goals and the frequency of seasonal trips depend upon many factors: age, family status, number and age of children, attitude toward national traditions (wedding, migrational and other), the nature of vocational training and so forth. For this reason, before moving on to an examination of the role of seasonal migration in the life of the different groups of its participants, let us describe the composition of the latter.

According to the data of our study, the age of seasonal migrants at the moment of their first trip averaged 27.4 years. In almost 1/2 of those questioned their age did not exceed 25 years, and in 70 percent it was 30 years, that is, an age when usually a family is founded (or its creation is planned) and new material concerns arise (Table 1). The lower age limit of the respondents was 16 years (they were just 3 percent). The transition to a universal secondary education, having brought the completion of school closer to induction into the army, noticeably raised the lower age limit of the seasonal migrants. At the moment of the survey, among the seasonal construction workers there were no 16-year-olds at all, while the share of 17- and 18-year-olds was insignificant, respectively, 0.4 and 1.3 percent.

**Table 1: Age Composition of Seasonal Migrants (at Moment of Poll)**

Age (Years)	Share, in %	Including	
		Coming for First Time	Migrants With Previous Experience
17-20	3	6	1
21-25	24	37	19
26-30	26	27	25
31-40	23	20	25
41-50	16	8	20
50 and older	8	2	10

Thus, at present people who have completed secondary school, as a rule, are included in the seasonal migration. It also happens that parents take along adult school children with them for earnings, but this is a rarity. In a word, the seasonal workers are marked by a relatively high educational level in comparison with local construction workers. Some 63 percent of the respondents had completed grades 10-11, 22 percent grade 9, 7.5 percent grade 7, 4 percent had completed grades 5-6, 3.5 percent had completed 4 and less grades. For comparison, let us point out that according to the data of other research, only 1 out of every 4 local construction workers has a secondary education and 3/4 have an incomplete secondary education.

We did not have sufficient information to thoroughly assess the effect of the seasonal trips on the choice of a profession (specialty). But the information which we do possess places in doubt the assertion that trips "for moonlighting" are an obstacle for obtaining other professions aside from construction ones. At the moment of the poll, almost 2/3 of the respondents possessed these. Basically they are industrial and transport workers. Over time the profession of construction worker becomes the main one for a portion of them. The possibility of earning significantly more than in the previous specialty has a crucial influence on the choice.

Participation of women in the moonlighter brigades is a great rarity and according to our data they are 2.2

percent. Basically, they are cooks who are representatives of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and inhabitants of the Western Ukraine who have learned construction professions.

For obtaining a sociodemographic portrait of a seasonal construction worker, those questioned were grouped by the following features: age, family status, number of juvenile children, and the presence of nonworking adult family members. In accord with these criteria, seven groups were established.

*Group I* (25.6 percent of the total number questioned) was represented by unmarried young people. All the respondents live with their parents, and an absolute majority has brothers and sisters. The average family size is 5.2 persons, and for almost half it is even higher, running to 13 persons. The proportional amount of families having nonworking adult members within them is a maximum here (2/3).

*Group II* (25.6 percent) also consists of young persons but who have already established their families. Almost 1/2 of those questioned has 1 child and 40 percent has 2-4. A predominant majority of the representatives from this group (71 percent) live separately from the parents. Naturally, the average family size here is smaller with 4.3 persons. Regardless of the absence of representatives of the older generations in a majority of the families, 60 percent of the respondents had nonworking adults, as a rule, women with young children.

*Group III* (15 percent) included respondents from 30 to 39 years of age with 1-2 children. The proportional amount of single-generation families in this group reaches 91 percent, while the share of families with nonworking adults, on the contrary, is minimal and this, evidently, is determined by the higher employment than in Group II for women in social production (the children are already going to school). In terms of the average family size (3.8 persons) the given group holds the penultimate position; it basically consists of natives from the Western Ukraine and Altay Kray.

*Group IV* (9.3 percent) differs from the previous only in the number of children for the respondents and each of them has from 3 to 7. All the representatives of this group are natives from the southern republics. The proportional amount of single-generation families here is also high (81 percent), but the share of families with nonworking adult members is almost double the amount in Group III. In terms of the average family size (5.9 persons), this group is only behind group VI.

The three last groups included respondents from the older working ages (40-49 years and over) having under-age children (24.5 percent). *Group V* (8.8 percent) is made up of persons questioned with 1 or 2 children. *Group VI* (10 percent) includes respondents from families with a maximum—from 3 to 15—number of children. In 1/2 of the families there are nonworking adults who take care of the children and manage the large household. Over 1/2 of the representatives of the group is

inhabitants from the autonomous republics of the Northern Caucasus. The last, smallest *Group VII* (5.7 percent) included seasonal construction workers of the older working ages (40-49 years and over) having adult children.

The size of the family is directly reflected in material prosperity (Table 2) and equally in the structure of demands at which the seasonal trips are aimed at satisfying (Table 3). Some 17 percent of the young unmarried respondents (*Group I*) came to earn money for their own wedding and 20 percent to help a large parental family. In this group there is 1.4-fold more than in the remainder of those who intend to spend the earned money on the purchasing of tape recorders, high-fashion clothing and tourist trips. The best off in material terms is the group of 30-39-year-olds with 1 or 2 children. Here the proportional amount of earned money for acquiring durable cultural and household articles, high-fashion clothing and tourist trips is several-fold (1.7-3.6) more than for the large-family representatives of the same age group. Among the latter, some 43 percent intended to spend the money on the support of children (in comparison with 12 percent in *Group III*) and there was a maximum number of those who planned to earn to build their own home (52 percent). With age (*Groups V* and *VI*) there is an

increase in the share of those who plan to help their own children (50-57 percent) and primarily those getting married (30-44 percent). Many begin putting aside money for "old age" (up to 70 percent in *Group V*). In the large families, the earned money is basically consumed on current expenditures. One of the most permanent reasons for seasonal migration is the intention to acquire one's own home. Some 35 percent of the seasonal construction workers mentioned this directly. A new home gives rise to a demand for furniture and other consumer durables (19 percent) so that after a certain interruption (used in a majority of instances to build one's residence) the seasonal migrations resume. Moreover, in the four groups approximately 25 percent of the respondents planned to purchase a car. With an increase in the number of children, as they grow older, expenditures rise for their support. A wedding organized in accord with national traditions requires a particularly large amount of money. The fact that 1/3 of those questioned has at least 3 children (16 percent with 3, and 17 percent with from 4 to 15) causes the repeated involvement of the respondents in the seasonal migrations. Thus, a large portion of those questioned had gone several times for seasonal work and many are engaged in this over the entire period of their working age.

**Table 2: Average Monthly Income of Respondents in Social Production (Not Including Earnings in Seasonal Jobs), %**

Income per Family Member, Rubles	Sociodemographic Groups of Seasonal Construction Workers*							Total
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
	17-29 Years		30-39 Years		40-49 Years		50 Years and Older	
To 30								
25	19	—	29	15	35	8	19	
31-50								
9	29	29	48	30	35	8	25	
51-70								
14	24	30	14	15	26	15	20	
71-100								
26	23	35	9	25	4	23	23	
Over 100								
26	5	6	—	15	—	46	13	

\* I—Unmarried; II—Married; III and V—Have 1-2 children; IV and VI—Many children (from 3 to 15 children); VII—Do not have under-age children.

**Table 3: Goals of Using Money Earned in Seasonal Work, %\***

Proposed Expenditures	Sociodemographic Groups of Seasonal Construction Workers**						
	17-29 Years		30-39 Years		40-49 Years		50 Years and Over
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Car, motorcycle, motorboat	29	24	9	24	25	13	—
Construction of home	36	41	33	52	15	17	39

**Table 3: Goals of Using Money Earned in Seasonal Work, %\***

Proposed Expenditures	Sociodemographic Groups of Seasonal Construction Workers**						
	17-29 Years		30-39 Years		40-49 Years		50 Years and Over
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Furniture, color TV, carpets	14	16	41	24	20	13	—
Tape recorder, high-fashion clothing, tourist trips	41	24	50	14	35	—	—
For children's wedding	—	—	6	10	30	44	23
Other aid to children	—	12	12	43	50	57	31
Savings for future	33	38	44	38	70	44	62
For own wedding	17	—	—	—	—	—	—
For current consumption	2	9	9	5	10	22	8
Aid to parents	19	5	—	—	—	—	—

\* Each respondent could mark several positions simultaneously.

\*\* See note to Table 2.

As was already mentioned, a significant portion of those questioned (42 percent) tries to make savings. This is particularly important for those who are unable to find a job in the place of permanent residence. The representatives of the mentioned group intend to participate in seasonal migration as long as their health permits. Furthermore, as some participants in the process grow older, their place is taken by maturing children. Characteristically, Groups IV-VI have virtually no novices while in Group I there proportional amount reaches 52 percent, 31 percent in Group II and 27 percent in Group III. The constant replacement of the seasonal migrants by involving in the process the younger generation which cannot settle its material problems at the place of permanent residence also shows the permanency of seasonal migration in the life of the population of a number of the nation's regions. According to the data of our poll, just 28 percent of the respondents had come for seasonal work for the first time, 27 percent had worked 2 or 3 seasons, 17 percent had worked 4 or 5, 15 percent had worked 6-9 and 13 percent from 11 to 26 seasons. An absolute majority (59 percent) of the construction workers intended to participate subsequently in the seasonal work and only 16 percent planned to stop this, while the remainder at the moment of the poll had not decided their plans.

Thus, regardless of the varying attitude toward seasonal migration, it is constantly resumed and will be resumed, as year after year a situation is reproduced when in certain regions a portion of the population is "driven out" for seasonal earnings, while in others a demand remains for the labor of newcomers.

As for the negative attitude toward this phenomenon on the part of a portion of society, to a significant degree it is related to the failure to resolve a number of socioeconomic problems of seasonal labor. The drive for quantity to the detriment of quality, the large number of incompleting projects and bad jobs left to the local construction

workers, the increased load factor on the local work superintendents in exercising control functions, and the increasing various forms of asocial conduct at the site of the seasonal jobs—these are the main complaints against the seasonal workers. At the same time, the leaders and specialists from the enterprises using the seasonal labor have pointed out that the brigades coming continuously to the same area build better. For this reason, special measures such as a system of long-term (for 3-5 years) labor contracts reinforced by material, length-of-employment and other benefits encouraging their concluding, the establishing of cooperatives of seasonal construction workers and so forth, could fundamentally improve the situation. Is this possible? In relying on the results of the research, I feel that it is a completely feasible task to make the brigades of migrant construction workers stable in each specific region.

The research conducted certainly does not exhaust all the questions related to seasonal labor migration. In particular, it is essential to have a more profound analysis of its social consequences. It is an indisputable fact that these are not always positive. Thus, according to the data of the survey, 1 out of 6 respondents considered the great overfatigue and the deteriorated state of health as among the most important problems of seasonal migration. One-quarter of those questioned stated that their families were against their trips. This list could be continued. Clearly, the need has arisen for conducting special research on the social problems of seasonal workers in the places of their permanent residence, in pooling the efforts of specialists from different regions in analyzing this still little-studied type of migration.

#### Footnote

1. One of the rural rayons in the south of Western Siberia was the empirical object of research and it had average indicators for socioeconomic development and the availability of personnel. Each year, around 700 seasonal

workers arrive at its construction projects on an unorganized basis. Their number approximately equals the total number of employees (of all sectors) arriving here for permanent residence. The poll covered around 1/3 of the seasonal construction workers: 31 percent of the respondents came from the autonomous republics of the Northern Caucasus, 24 percent from the Transcaucasus Republics, 22 percent from the Western Ukraine, 20 percent from nearby towns and villages, and 3 percent from other places. The seasonal brigades were chosen on two grounds: the area of permanent residence and the type of enterprise with which a contract had been concluded. In the selected brigades, all the workers were questioned.

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## FACTS, COMMENTARIES, NOTES

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## PUBLIC FORUM OF THE SCIENTIST

### True Optimism Is Based on Realism

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[Article by Tatyana Ivanovna Zaslavskaya, academician and president of the Soviet Sociological Association and director of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Economic and Social Questions Under the AUCCTU and the USSR Goskomtrud. She is the author of the monographs "Migratsiya selskogo naseleniya" [Migration of Rural Population] (1970), "Razvitiye selskikh poseleniy" [The Development of Rural Settlements] (1977), "Metodologiya i metodika izucheniya sovetskoy derevno" [Methodology and Methods of Studying the Soviet Countryside] (1980), "Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoye razvitiye sibirskogo sela" [The Socioeconomic Development of the Siberian Village] (1987) and others. She has been repeatedly published in our journal]

[Text] The active participation of scientists in political life is one of the vivid examples of perestroika. The standard of a civilized society is replacing the rather unassuming

formula of "scientific support for social management." Each scientist has the right not only to have his own view of one or another problem, but also to defend it in the process of taking managerial decisions. For social scientists this principle, in addition to this, is a standard of professional ethics. For their ideas and conclusions involve the fates of many, many people and the silence of science costs society too much.

Of course, the state of social sciences, and in particular sociology, is far from meeting those tasks which perestroika has posed for them. All the same, the scientists do have something to say to their fellow citizens. The finest representatives of the humanitarian intelligentsia have won their recognition not only by profound scientific search but also by an active and uncompromising struggle for the renewal of our society. Proof of this is the electing of many prominent humanitarian social scientists, including sociologists, as USSR people's deputies and their promotion to among the leaders of the movements in support of perestroika.

To acquaint the readers with the opinion of a scientist and citizen and to relate the participation of sociologists in sociopolitical life and how they are defending and realizing their ideas and proposals—these are the main tasks of the new heading "Public Forum of the Scientist." This is opened by an article of the USSR People's Deputy and Academician T.I. Zaslavskaya. The text is based on a speech which Tatyana Ivanovna proposed giving at the First Congress of the USSR People's Deputies.

Recently much has been said about how the social sphere of our society lags particularly strongly behind present-day demands. Its crisis state is determined by a number of factors. First of all, as a result of the decades of stagnation, many problems have built up requiring an immediate solution. If one were to rank these problems depending on what share of the population insists upon their primary solution, they would stand as follows: environmental pollution (87 percent), a shortage and poor quality of food (82 percent), housing shortage (79 percent), a narrow assortment and poor quality of industrial goods (74 percent), injustice in the distribution of goods (73 percent) and a high level of retail prices (67 percent).

It is scarcely possible to solve the named problems gradually, one by one, as they are so acute. But the state at present is incapable of moving simultaneously in all directions. Moreover, the problems which have built up over the decades at present are supplemented by new ones, at times even more acute. A majority of these has arisen as a result of the restructuring of economic relations. Here one could put the liberating of hundreds of thousands and even millions of workers from the spheres of administration and production, the growing socioeconomic differentiation of the social groups, the forming of poles of poverty and wealth which are more obvious in

society than before, the exacerbating of interethnic relations and increased crime. These problems can be handled only on the basis of a strong and at the same time internally balanced social policy.

The development of glasnost has contributed to a significantly more profound understanding by the people of the severity of the crisis being lived through by society. In this context, the difficulties and problems which previously were fraught only with passive dissatisfaction and sharp anecdotes now are causing a completely different response. Political meetings and demonstrations have not only become part of society's life, but also there are well-organized strikes and other forms of protest. Under the difficult conditions of perestroika, when the situation of some groups is deteriorating and others are gaining greater opportunities for flourishing, the human masses become uncontrollable, "hot-headed" and sometimes even "explosive." In this situation, social administration is turned into one of the most complex types of political activity and the fate of the nation depends on its effectiveness.

Finally, one major problem is the large budget deficit and the significant external debt which sharply restrict the volume of financial and material resources which can be channeled into social needs. At the same time, the carrying out of such social tasks as broadening housing construction and improving its quality, increasing the wages of the lowly-paid strata of the population and pensions, providing the population with high-quality goods, the purifying of the water, air and soil and accelerating of social development in the countryside require very significant amounts of money. Possibly, a particular acuteness in the situation derives from the fact that people are tired of waiting and have lost faith in the promises of the leaders to improve the situation over the near future. The authority of the party and the state has declined and is continuing to fall. More and more often one hears that it was easier to live before perestroika as there were more goods and prices were lower. In this situation it is essential to convince people that, regardless of the obvious deterioration in many spheres, strategically perestroika meets their interests and should provide a qualitative improvement in life. I am convinced that under the existing circumstances, each ruble intelligently invested into the social sphere is capable of producing an economically high return. But, unfortunately, there are not sufficient funds for satisfying the most urgent social needs. Under these conditions, there is a particular rise in the role of that subjective position which is held by social groups interested in changes in the social sphere.

The causes of the crisis being lived through by Soviet society undoubtedly are of a social nature. They consist in the mass alienation of people from social goals and values, including highly productive labor. In order to emerge from the crisis, it is essential to overcome this alienation and see to it that people consciously and willingly take part in transforming their own life, using their entire creative and intellectual potential for this. It

is important that social conscience become an active factor in the renewal and development of everyday life. At the same time, in its nature, social conscience is rather conservative and in an age of revolutionary changes, as a rule, it plays not an accelerating role in social development but rather a restraining one.

In terms of the current situation in social conscience, it is possible to isolate the following conservative aspects: the burdening down with dogmas and erroneous ideological pat phrases; the prevalence of primitively leveling values over the values of truly skillful labor; the parasitic expectation of help from the "all-powerful" state; a clearly expressed group nationality, local and departmental egoism; a low political culture and social aggressiveness; tolerance of such phenomena as petty thievery, impoliteness and so forth.

How is this specifically expressed? First of all, by the ideological dogmas one can explain the inadequate perception of social realities. Among these one must put, in particular, the existence and growth of unemployment and a level of social guarantees that is significantly less in comparison with the developed capitalist states. Over a long period of time in the USSR there has been high employment of the working-age population and frequently this was determined not so much by production needs as by the social necessity of guaranteeing labor for anyone who wanted to work. At the enterprises and on the staffs of the organizations there were millions of employees who did not bring any noticeable benefit. Their reduction could lead only to a gain, but since their "labor" was paid for by a generous state, such ballast did not influence the economy of the enterprise.

The introduction of self-financing has markedly changed the situation. At present, the collectives are endeavoring to rid themselves of the ballast. Further changes in the economic relations should lead to an acceleration of technical progress, the elimination of enterprises and areas of labor operating at a loss and to the release of superfluous workers. It is important that the people be psychologically ready for a possible reduction in the number of jobs, for the necessity of finding a new job, for retraining and for changing the sphere of employment and profession. Many will have to accept less interesting, less prestigious and more poorly paid jobs. Some of them will not find any work at all which is to their liking, in other words, they will remain unemployed for a certain time.

Is social conscience ready for a correct perception of these problems? Is a majority of the people aware that the situation in the employment sphere is even now different than before and in the future will merely become more complicated and that the demands placed on the workers by the national economy will change correspondingly? The results of public opinion polls carried out by the VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion] provide rather negative answers to these questions. In truth, the people are rather well informed of the cutbacks in personnel which have

commenced and one out of every two respondents had already personally encountered this process and 4/5 knew of it from friends and colleagues. The managerial workers were better informed than the others about this (85-87 percent) and least so the workers of the kolkhozes and sovkhazes (78 percent).

The notions of the further fate of those being dismissed are still optimistic. One-half of those questioned assumes that those dismissed will find equal jobs without any particular difficulty or, in undergoing slight retraining, will go to work in other specialties. A third of the respondents thinks that the dismissed workers will either take less skilled or more poorly paid jobs or move into jobs in a cooperative or in the sphere of individual labor activity. Only 19 percent allowed the notion that a portion of them, at least for some time, would remain without work and permanent income. The mentioned notions are closely linked to answers to the question of the probability and the possibility of the rise of unemployment in the USSR. As is known, in the nation there are a number of labor-surplus areas. The increase in the number of jobs has not kept pace with the high natural increase in the population characteristic of these regions. As a result, the share of the unemployed population has been increasing and this is, incidentally, one of the reasons for the exacerbation of interethnic relations. Regardless of this, 58 percent of those questioned feel that unemployment in the USSR is fundamentally inadmissible and impossible while 17 percent see that it could occur only as a temporary limited phenomenon. Only 13 percent of those questioned shared the opinion that modern production needs not only a skilled labor force but also a mobile one, and a definite portion should be constantly in the reserve (for example, undergo retraining, participate in individual labor activity, the raising of children and so forth). This shows the unpreparedness of social awareness to accept the employment situation which will soon be upon us. The ideological stereotype according to which unemployment is impossible in our country entails a social danger as with the first collision with life it inevitably will collapse and it will be difficult for people to live through the related disappointment. Possibly we must introduce more pessimistic but realistic notions of the social processes. In order that these prevail we must completely abandon the embellishing of social reality. Beginning with the school desk, the children and juveniles must be given an objective and accurate portrait of that society in which they will live.

Another serious problem is the orientation prevailing in the public of leveling values and the far-from-rare identification of social justice with social equality. We largely owe such a view to science which for a long time asserted that the USSR has created a uniform, even a completely uniform society, where social differences between all strata and groups are obliterated. As a result, many people at present prefer splitting up a small "pie" evenly than a large one in different proportions. Research of public opinion clearly shows this. Thus, a significant

portion of the population is not satisfied with the increased differences in the prosperity of individual groups. To the question of who actually gains from the changes occurring in the nation, the respondents mentioned most frequently the cooperative members, leaseholders, swindlers and intriguers. One of the manifestations of leveling attitudes is the notion of depriving the leadership of all privileges, regardless of the volume and effectiveness of the work done by the leaders (such an opinion was voiced by from 25 to 42 percent of the respondents). As for such values as creative labor, ownership of the means of production, the possibility of entrepreneurship activity, economic freedom and economic risk, judging from the results of the polls, these are not noticeably widespread. All of this impedes a transition to economic management methods. Certainly the main goal of this transition is to emancipate the creative forces of people and create powerful material incentives for high-quality labor. It is evident, however, that this task does not find a strong response in the mind of the people.

Firmly rooted in the public mind is a phenomenon which I would call socioeconomic infantilism. This is apparent in a naive certainty in the unlimited nature of the state's material and financial resources with the state obliged to satisfy the requirements of the citizens, regardless of how they work or what they produce. Even in the speeches of many of the USSR people's deputies at the congress, the certainty was voiced that the state has merely to actually want to and it will be able to both increase wages for those who do not earn much, reduce prices for food products and expand housing construction and do a mass of other things which will improve the lives of many millions of people. As for the dependence of the state's capabilities upon the efficient labor of its citizens, many simply do not pay any attention to such a dependence. Hence, the endless demands to increase the centralized allocation of resources for various social requirements, demands which are not backed up by economic studies as to where these resources are to be found.

Why in terms of his own life can each person realize that it is essential to correlate expenditures with income but on the social level this simple consideration is ignored? One of the possible explanations is that the increased expectations of the citizens in relation to the state are the result of the protracted dominance of a certain ideology. This ideology imposed on people the conviction that everything that they have is granted to them by the socialist state and to which they should show gratitude. The providing of permanent employment, the possibility of teaching children in school, free medical services, relatively cheap housing, the possibility of traveling to a vacation home and so forth and so forth—all of this has been interpreted not as the simple distribution of the goods produced by the people themselves but rather as an indicator of the concern of the authorities for their people. Now society is reaping the fruit of such an upbringing. For overcoming this socioeconomic infantilism and for raising the economic and political maturity

of public opinion, it is going to require a good deal of time and effort but this work must be done.

One other noteworthy feature of modern public awareness is its heterogeneity and the presence of a multiplicity of opposing judgments, opinions and interests on virtually every question. This trait was vividly demonstrated by the congress. Although its main aim was the achieving of consensus, in practice there was a very acute clash of both opinions as well as philosophies and interests standing behind them. The starkest differences were disclosed between the Muscovites and the "provincials," the intellectuals and the workers, the scientists and the remaining portion of the congress, military and civilians, city dwellers and country folk, those who control and those who are controlled, the residents of the Baltic Republics and the residents of the Central Asian Republics, the "radicals" and the "conservatives." And each of the sides, as a rule, did not make much of an effort to heed the arguments of the other. The discussion came down to a multiplicity of monologues the authors of which did not listen to one another.

An essential condition for efficient social administration is a reliable and complete knowledge of public opinion over the questions involving the vital interests of people. Here the administrative bodies should know not only the prevailing opinion, but also the specific opinions characteristic of the inhabitants of various regions, types of settlements, workers from different sectors, representatives of various nationalities, professions and demographic groups. To the question posed by sociologists of what information is most essential for their public activities, 60 percent of the people's deputies replied data on public opinion concerning problems being discussed by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions and committees. In responding to this request, the VTsIOM intends to conduct research not only in the socioeconomic area but also the sociopolitical one. In the opinion of the collective, one of the main tasks of the center

should be to satisfy the requirements of the USSR people's deputies for nondepartmental, objective and procedurally reliable information on the ideas and opinions of social groups the interests of which touch on the laws being prepared and adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this context, study should be given to the question of the advisability of transferring the VTsIOM to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Of course, a study of the opinions functioning in a society is still not all that is required for social administration. It is essential to actively influence the opinions being shaped in the population and contribute to raising their competence, permanency, clarity and adequacy of expression. Only in effectively operating on public awareness is it possible to overcome those stereotypes of it which impede perestroika. And this, in turn, presupposes the free functioning of different opinions on the most urgent questions, the broad publishing of the results of sociological polls in the press, the clash of different viewpoints on TV and radio broadcasts, the conducting of open political debates between groups with different views and familiarizing the people with the opinions of leading scientists. In a majority of the highly developed nations, this has long become a permanent element in public life. We still have a long way to go in this direction. It is essential to overcome the technocratism of thinking characteristic of a majority of the representatives of executive power, achieve the dissemination of sociological knowledge and establish a base for the creative development of social sciences. The growing interest of administrative workers in public opinion, that is, its content, mechanisms of shaping and procedures of functioning, on the one hand, is a natural result and on the other, a most important prerequisite for the deepening of the democratization of society and the development of glasnost.

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